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BIBLIOGRA.PHY 
THE ROLE OF SENSUS CO 
IN 
ARISTOTLE, Tll AS AQU INAS. LOCKE AND 1W1'1' 
CHAPTER I 
I TltODtJOTIOI 
The main purpo•e ot thia thesis is to olarU'y the historical 
me n1ng of Thom1st1c•AJ'1atotel1an oonoeption ot the sensus oolllBW'lial by-
expl ining i t a origin, background, development as it h a influenced the 
ph1loaophy of later philoeophera, •epeoially ot Looke end Kant. Seneua 
oommunia is aometi~Ma 1nolud d in the aenaue 1nter1orea2 or sometimes re-
lated -to the "internal aen .. "S• And the notion ot 1Dner aenae4 ie aooept-
ed by Kant a an object ot epistemological transcendental aoh-. . "Time 
is oonaidered by him aa an _ ;eriori form of the inner s nae. 
1. saying "oo n aenae" in thia theaia 1 always meant t his aonaue 
co nia. 
2. thomas employ d plural tol'll. Rt. p. 59. 
3 . Locke's 'internal aon e~ , i.o., r tleot1on. 
4. Kant's Inn rer Sinn. 
-
1 
v/ 
I 
Jl 
It seems t hat there are 'Very l i ttle relationships between 
Ar i stotle • s "Sensu a Contlluni a" and Kutian conception of "Innerer Sinn tt. 
But on examining more closely the Aristotle's psychologi cal doctrines, 
we can diaooTer that some of the important conceptions of later philosoph-
ers are already stated or discussed in the writing of Aristotle. Espeoiar 
ly Aristotle' s account on the Sensus Communis in"VOlves several important 
problema which influenced the philosophy of mediaeval and modern thinkers. 
The analysi s of the ttooJIIJJIOn sensible a", the concept of the synthetic 
power of sanae-perception, the argument of selt-oonaoiouaneas, eto., 
are the embrtoa of the Lookean dj atinction of ''primary and secondary 
qualities u or Leibnidan "apperception''. Even the conception of Time 
can be obserYable in the listing of the Common Sensiblea in ita relation• 
ship to the oonoept of motion. 
It looks that this study, which treats the problem of the 
I relati on of peri pheral sense-perception to t he po'Y. er of intellect, 
tomns the core of the discussion of modern p sychology. And, at the same 
time, :modern philosophy up to Kant has beE>.n all in some extent moti Tated 
by the criticism of the Thomisti.c•Aristot.elian conception of knowing 
faculties. 
'this is a study of how Aristotelian faculty-conception ot 
sensus communis has developed into Kantian transcendental achematism. 
For this reason, although Kant employs same terminology in t he Kritik 
·r urteilakrattl, the main discussion in th i a thesi s· Vlil l be centered 
in his &riticism of "Innerer Sinn." 
1. KfUlt, KU, ·169. 
2 
II 
I 
A. The Inner and the Outer. 
Philo 80phy, according to i' errier, 1 consisted o t two main 
(b) Ontology ( A6y.os 1'wY ~vrwv), the science of that which truly is. S 1 
of these, the latter, he maintained, naturally comes to us first. Human 
reflection always looks outward before it looks inward and consequently 
cosmological inquiries into the nature of the physical world preceded in-
quiries int o the way in wh:i.ch knowledge of the physical world is acquired. I 
In early Greek thought, these cosmological inquires centered . 
around the attempt to discover a "material principle" or "cause " from 
which every living thing li.e., animated things; the concept of which 
involves the animal kingdom as well as the vegetable kin&dom4) and non-
living originated. But gradually epistemio problems ceme into prominence 
among Greek thinkers, and it may be said that Socrates was the first who 
set the current or Greek thought definitely in this direction. 
His student, Plato, introduced two dualistic schemes of 
Pg.ycho-epitemologioal formulae: two realas of objects, i.e., the real amd 
) ( 
1. The t e rm epistemology which derives from two Greek words of e-TTt6"7'f"7-
(knowledge) and ~o'vos {science) was used for the first time 'b~ 
Ferrier. 1 
2. Ferrier, IOM, 48. 
s. Ferrier, IOM, 47. 
4. Lucretius and Cicero distinguished animus (mind) from anima (life or 
the living). Lucret ius, ue rer. nat., III, 1S6•160J Cicero,~·· 
I, 19·22. 
I 
I 
I 
~ 
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,I 
I 
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I 
the phenomenal; and two modes of apprehension: i.e., thought or intellect, ,, 
II 
a pure unmixed activity of the soul, and belief or opinion, a combination I 
:,, 
of thought and perception • . The sheer distinction of the outer and the , 
inner proceeded to a new stage of metap~sioal distinction of .a noumenal 
world of reality which can be ap·)rehended by intellect and a phenomenal, 
world of appearance which can be apprehended by sanae perception. 
B. Sensation and Intelleot,l 
The study of the oogni ti ve po~ers was first attempted by the 
early Greek materialists who tried to interpret the physical world in its I 
I 
relationship to the subject. The soul had been conqeived by the early II 
philosophers as the oause of life in the body and alao, after they began 
to reflect on the subjective powers, as the cause of sensation. 
Suoh notions that there are visible things suoh as 11doles' 
( E11.6w~O{) which flow off from an object, similar in shape to the 
objects from which they flow and fall .into the eyes of the persons seeing, i 
resulting in sight, were held by Leuo~ppus and Democritus. All sense-
experiences were reduced to the atomic sensationaliss of actual 'touch' 
of soul-atom and atoms of the external objeots.2 
1. It is s_aid that Alc~aeon of Crotona distinguished sene. ibility/or sense-
perception \ Q!C~vc-a:Az.L ) from intelligence \ 1B )~vl. e-1/tX.L), and 
to have oonfined the possession of the latter to huma eings. cr. . 
Beare, GfEC, 261. I 
2. Aristoteles, ~·, 442b. 
II 
6 
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I 
I! 
I 
This atomic interpretat,.on of the inner-outer relationship 
was helpfUl for the physical expl~ation of sense~experie~oe in space. 
riut it could not solve t~e temporal aspect of psychic phenomena such as 
the preservation and reproduction ~f images acquired by the individua~ 
sense-organ, This process requires , much greater and more complex activity 1 
of the mind which combines pr di scriminat E> s those images. i-'lato was the II 
first great exponent of the rationalistic method in this field, irom the 
I crittoism of' sense-experience which is rather relative, he regarded 
lj 
part of knowledge aa dependent upon sensation and part as due to the ideaall 
·~ that are in the mind from the beginning. !tor him sensations must be sup-
J plemented and corrected by the ideas innate in the soul, before they give 
true knowledge. 
HoweTer• Plato's ideas were the prototypes of things that 
exist bef'ore objects in .the universe or in the mind of God and were regard' 
ed as part of the original endowment of' the soul before any experience. 
l'his as sumption was the basis for Plato's moral doctrine as well as his 
epistemology. Re tried to show that the sensible world was derived from 
the world of Ideas. Aristotle, on the other hand, waa an empiricist. He 
started with a definite observation or group of obserTations and develop-
ed his general principles from them. And from these series of observation 
of various theories as well as ot his own Denkexperiment, he separated 
Platonic modes of apprehension from the realm of the object of knowledge. 
According to. iiammond,l .l"lato ',a faculties of the mind "depend J.tpon the : 
1. Hammond, AP, xxvi. Also in xxvii he says, "Plato's entire p-.ychology, 
in which the soul's parts are separated into existentially distinct 
units with distinct anatomical organs. is ethico-teleologically deter-
mined. Aristotle's ps.yohology, on the contra~, is biologically de-
termined; the soul is a unitary life functioning in distinct modes or I 
faculties. It is a single indivisible mind expressing itself in 
nutrition, sense-perception, imagination, memory, reasoning. 
r 
I 
6 
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I aooount on. th ·theoretical activi ty or the higher t oulti a of mind 1 
~~ :::tm Y4>:·:.::: :td~.:::•dl:::: ::~:::: :~::~t~: .. l:~ th 
! and r ntionnl kDo lodge of man in the term of t'aculti es .l d tt "'·' 
the combin tion or the Pl ton1o doctrine ot~ the r lat1on 1p of s in 
-
end .rkenncn end th : r1 stotel1an concepti on of th pB,yohologioal po 
ot the mind that developed i nto t he editioe ot tho later Soholaet1c 
anthropolo of ~ /tquin s a.nd others.2 
C. 'l'h Outer •ense alld Inner Sense. 
Though the term , outer aens9 or sensu s exteriorea , s not 
e p l oyed by Greek philoaopher s , we o n obse~ tho fr quent us ge of 
special eonses 1n Aristot l e. The 1 . diate instr nt• for the appre-
hena·on and tnt rpr t tion or the external wor l4 r the ense-organs 
whioh ar i'ive in n b r, i.e ., the senses ot' sight, hear ing ., snell , 
... 
taste nd touoh . For Aristotle the son e-proces and t h s .nse-object 
are one -tn t he otual s naa.tion . Sound and he ring , fo r exa ple , e.lthou h 
thQy a ra notionally distinct, are identical in the ct ot s~ns tion .4 
:urther the s ense r eceiv 1 an ~pression ot p1ctu r of L~ obj ct, a.s 
1. In aomo oreatur os , as we ha'f'e s i d , all or the abov ent ioned 
psychic powers a r e round, in ot her cert i n of th , and i n till 
othort~ onl y on • By po r s we mean hero t he power of nutrition., of' 
appetite , of' ensation, o.f m.oventent in spaco , and of ration 1 thou ht. ' 
1 tot 1 s , J an., 414 !1. 
2. Even in the K ntian ystem, especially in his pr e-critical ri~nge, we 
can obsei"'''' th in!'l.uonoe ot Sobol tio psychology. cr. Kant ., \lSI in 
toto . 
-
~ .. . ri totelo:'l , T>e . n ., 4~4b 2~26. 
4. Ari ·totE)l s , ........ .-an-.., 24u 2.5• 425b 26J 418a. 1. 
L __ _ 
lf~ -
Jl 
M impr ssion ot a eal-ring ithout the bron~ or gold or 
th y,. id . ntionl "ii'lth the obj ot; it 
I
ll 
only differs fro t h object• in its o(\e or being . 
,I 
:(he sene ppr henda 
II a •n11tat1'f'o l ent b longtn to nn. 1ndh'1 u .1. 2 
II ay tho ia val philo opher S the t w. 
mployo in t plao of r1stot lien proper en os. .r totl • u z ot 
''pr oper" w in the 9 ns th t the content 1 proper to e oh s na or n . 
T era to , the xpre eion o:t the t'ext rior" e1gn1ti that th souroe o r 
the en t1on ia extr • or ani • the oppoait oonG ption o f' the •• xterior" 
is int rior. * And that or the. '~rop r" is "oo n. " Therefor ., 'When 
, 'thomas id that i'h interior en i o 11 d n not by predication, 
s if it were a. g nu , but as the Common root d pri oiple of' the ext rior 
a nse , 114 the interior ensos w r r eg rded as oo n because they r · 
intr • org nic prinblpl · ot ;the exterior eon es. This interpretation ot 
the "interi r and "ext rior'1 e .1 1nher1 ted in Lo an cone ption of 
the "intern 1 " end ext I'Jlal• " 
D. Problealh 
analysis of' s~n e-p rcept.ione ine'ritablr lead us to th study of muoh 
hi'h r structure otkno 1 acthi.ty. Fi rst ot all, hG noticed th :t the 
1s a po !' of d i d 00 p d · the dat of th pEicial nae-. . 
all or which are in ·a un1<>at1on ~1 th 1t. ~,nd th n ther are ome 
1 . iatoteles , D an. , 4:~4e. 2'11 426a 26J 424& 19-28J De mem., 460 30 . 
•* 1 " 
. s . ,sneoi lly noenn , who assigned five las it is five in n her 1n the 
oas• of xterior nso ) aenaith••) powers& i) oommon aon e, 11) phantas ' 
11 J tm g,ination, 1v; th· stimativ , v) the memor tiv • I 
1 
4. or. 28 , note 4 . J 
========~- =-==- .'""r~-=~ 
___ _ __ IL 
- . -- - -~~- :~- : ~iti s hioh oan b pe;roeiV:.- by_t'ftO_:--:;~:,r dtrr -rent p~~P -r --
1~ 
II 
only peroeivo , but perc iYe that ' c~ do ao. l'hia ~~ a. eynthetio power ot 
the ind w. ioh c lled by later ph:llosophera2 aa apperception. 
• d fro the oonoeption or Kantian apperception we understand time as 
an a .priori .form of the inner sense. 
In short , e oan aUIIImflri&e the important issues which influence 
1 t r phi losophers aa f'olloweh 
{1) 'l:he probl o the ,ynthetio power ot the ind, especially of the 
sene perception, 
U) The problem of' the aelt•oonao1oueneaa, 
~3) e probl of' the oona.ption of dme, whioh ia oloaely related to 
the synthetic power of' the inner aenae. 
'l'ho e are th problt:.ms whi.oh were di aooYered by riatotle i n 
his in'nstigation of the Co11110n Senaiblea. d thesa thr h vo lon 
b en iacussed by Yariou philoaophera . .But before we go into the detail s 
of' . istotelian analy 1s of' these problaas, e must go baok to the pre-
deoes~ra who treat d the a e probleaa and who influenced Aristotle. 
1. Aristoteles , fJe an., 418a l5J De mem., 458b 2. 
2. Leibnb and Kant . Cf. Iwanami , l 'S, 869. 
=-=--~-~.~r-=-== ~--======~~~==~=-=-==~====~~==~=-=-===---~ 
I 
CHAPTER II 
THE CONCEPTION AND BACKGROUND OF SENSUS COMMUNIS 
A. The , Conception of Sensus Communis.-
The term, sensus communis, is 
whioh was used first by Aristotle for the 
a translation of . rro O"J D<l~G7~ 1 
faoulty of synthesis which was 
referred to sense. It was the Arabic translators and commentators2who used 
the term, Sensus ~ommunis, which inT<Olved the psychical pnloeases, such as 
imagination, phantasy and memory. 
The sensus communis is regarded, by Thomas Aquinas, as one of 
the powers of the Sensus Interiores in relation to the powers of Imagination, 
Memory and Sense-Judsaent \Tis aestiaativa), eto. But until Thomas Aquinas 
!analyzed the co~otations of the term, most of the commentators of Al"istote-
'lian psychology interpreted sensus communis in muoh wider sense including 
the whole psychiQal processes except the so-called five senses. 
It is necessary here to consider how muon. of what Aristotle had 
to say regarding it was to be found in the speculations of his predecessors. 
However, sinoe they did not undertake the discussion of the faculty of 
synthesis as such, we must aa~isfY ourselves with stating the functions 
~ioh were ascribed by Aristotle to the Sensus Communis, and seeing how 
judgint; sense ~ To .1-f p.z v o v ) • . 1 ; 
. I 
12. Especially Avicenna {979-l037 •• D.) and Averroes (1126•1198 A.D.). 
,I 
1. Aristotle seldom uses this actual term \Of. 4?.5a 27; 450a lOJ 686a ~1), / 
often employing equivalents l.ike pr.imar.y sense (To 7lf?WT OY CY~W:zTcf101 
9 
II 
I 
l Q 
= -=-==---==-==-=-II== 
' these fUnctions ore dealt ~th b,y preceding ps.ychologists. To this depart-
1 of' the min ist otle asaigned: 
Ill (a) the power of' discriminating and comparing the data of the sp cial senses, 
I all of' which ar i n communication wit h the powerJ 
I 
I (b) the perception of' th 'coJIJibOn sendbles,' \ 1d kot.. vcf ) of' •hich tile 
pr inci p l ovement, Form, Number • gnitudo and ' 1 e; 
!I 
!1 \C ) the oonsoiousness o f our aeneory experienoee, i.e., the pollfer by which 
I 
II 
we not only perceive, but perc iw ~ w percei .,.., , 
TO / II (d ) the faculty of' i magination, i •• reproductive im .g1nntion \p50vrcxop rrov J . 
I (e) the faculty of' emory and r omini sc nee , \ / 1nll*? k«? dtz~w?61S) 
( t) tho e.ffootions 0 r !tl. f')8p1ng and dr eamin - • 
1l As to the conception o f t h synt hetic t a cultyl hioh is involTed 
I
! in ~a) , \b) and (o) was not di tinotly tbnaulated, until we reach Plato. But 
/ befo r e e look into Pl to' s view on ~1e s nse•peroept1on, the interp retatio 
II o f 8 ek t ori 11 t a should be noted. 
II 
B. Th B ckgro und or t.ristotle' s Seneua CoJI1DlW1i e . 
(l) The Interpret tion of Greek ·ate r lalita• 
Ae is nt1oned betor • the early Or ek thinkers who are ce.ll• 
d philoeophlci nat ur los by t he med1aeTnl phlloaopher sought fbr the 
II principle ( ~P.JJ , princleium) or an Ellemental substance fro which eyery 
1 living !lild non-11v1n thing w s coapoeed. 'I'hoir principles, e en a s Thelea ' 
II II . -- X: 
tar (z.YJ'T), xi der's boundless or unlimi"Ced \_ro ()!117e:-c.l6V ), 
wero the princi pl es or the end c xi etenoe including ell liTing thi ng e . 
J:heir philosophy 1 o 11 d uylozoi , 1. • the doctrine of the 11M!Iedie.te 
l. Hewueataoin ,. though Kantian notion of t he unity 
l e'f'el. 
======= --·====================~====================================!~====== 
unity of matter \ ~/\?) and life {jwf )l,aooording to 'Which matter is by 
nature endowed with life, and life is inseparabl y connected with matter . 
1 Probably they might have tried to explain the activity of human soul from 
hylozoi stic standpoint, but no fUrther data about the relation o f sense-
perception and the sensus communis can be available from the extant frag-
ments of these philosophers.2 
Some passages of Heraclitus (fifth century B.C. ) who held that 
1 all kno,'lfledge comes to man •through the door of the senses, 1 and Pr ot!i'.go r a s 
\C. 484-411 B.C.) who maintained that the entire ps,rohio life was made up 
II 1 
only of sensations, tell us that they turned their eyes from th~ outer world ' 
of nature which, according to that, is nothing but flux, to the inner world 
which is a receptacle of the relative experience of the flux coming through 
the sensation. 
l'he 1110re empirical and consequently materialistic stue\y· o f the 
mind oan be observable in the theories of Empedooles (c. 490-435 H.C .). 
1 De.mocritus \o. 460-STO B.c.) and a little l ater in the writing of ~picurus 
1 (c, 341-270 B.c.). They did not doubt the exi stence of the objec ' s in the 
exte rnal wo rld which give off from their surfaces or pores effluvia (~pe­
docles) o r which projected. faint images , simulacra o r eidola (Democri tus 
and Epicurus) to the mi nd. lt~or them, especially for Epiourus, 1 sensation 
is irrational l ?f)\oro> ) and ther efore does not a.tmit o f !>roof. ' 3 
In De rerum natura, Lucretius, the follower of Epicurus, des~ 
oribea his mnster•s doctrine, i n which he explaina some of the faculties 
1 1, ihenoe the word Hylo-zoism oomas. 
2. ui els, FV . 
3. Lucretius, £!. !!:!..• nat. I. Prolegomena 62. 
I 
11 
---J:_ 
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of the mind which were attributed to the power of senaus communis • 
..,1 /) Fo r ~:pi curua the funda.."''lenta l cri terion is sensation , o<'or:TJ~') ) , " we 
must keep all our inv stigations in accord t:rit h ou r sensations", ''the 
criteria of tru"th ar e t he sensations and concepts and the feelings " .1 
Sensation is the ultimate and only ori terion of truth. 
You ~rill find that the oonoept of the true 
is begotten from the senses at first, and 
that the senses cannot be gainaaid.2 
Taking it for granted that sensation transmits to us t he 
not i ties veri, how can we interpret.·the various sensations given by t he 
di ffer~nt organs a s a unity o r a s a manifoldt To see a 'street-oar coming 
and to hear its noise are two different experiences through the two sense-
o rgan s of ear and eye. (Jr again "to sea 11 and "to peroei ve ~ I seen 
are a lso dif.ferent experiences. Epiourus refuted the po s sibil i ty:-of sensus 
com!llunis as the principle or f aculty 0 f synthetic po er of the mind l'thioh 
combines those various sense-experiences received from the outer san sesa 
Will the ears be able to pass judgment on 
the ~as, or touch on the ears! Or again 
will the taste in the mouth refute this 
touchJ will the nostrils disprove it. or 
the ayes show it f'alset3 · 
1. Lucretius, ue rer. Uat.,I~ 52. 
_.._... ......... 
2. "Invenie s primis ab sensibus esse creatam notitiem veri neque sensus 
posse re:felli." Lucretius, B!.!.!!.• ~·· iv, 178-479. 
' . 
s. "An poterunt oculos auras reprehendere; an auris t aotusT an hunc porro 
taotum sapor arguet oris, an confutabunt nares ooulive revincent? " 
Luoretius, De rer. nat., vi. 486-488. Cf, Augustinus, De lib. a rb. 
II, 3&4.--- ---
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No; beoQe ee.oh sense has its proper faculty set apart from 
the other; eaoh has its own power.l But 
i f you do not accept communis sensus, 
there will be no standara-QYlihioh we 
can reach the truth about hidden things.2 
In saying ~.!!!.communis, however, Lucretius meant r ather 
the general concept which was first given through the sensus proprii 
(five peripheral senses) and apprehended as unity (which Epiourus called 
anticipation. 7Tfd>.?Y t£ ) • He was not thinking of any independent 
facul·ty of sensus communis in Aristotelian sense of the v.rord. For 
Epicurus, the image of sight, for instance, af'ter having been perceived 
by the eyes, passes on into the mind and is there stored up and can be 
reoalled in the a.ot ofmomory. Moreover, \men we have had ;a number o f 
11 
I 
I 
I 
lr 
I 
such images of any one class of things, they unite in a ki~d of 'com osite J 
photog raph'! of the objeot and so form a general conception or 'concept' J 
of the thing, to whioh we can refer as a test afterwords.4 The reason 
why Epiourus called this general concept by the name of 'anticipation• is 
because it enables us to anticipate the appearance or. anything and to give 
them some notion which was acquire d by a series of sensations or things 
which belong to the srume species. This might be not absolutely true. 
1. "Ne.m sorsum cui que poteste.s di vi east, eua vis ouiquest •••• , Lucr etius, 
De rer. nat.,v1.,489-490. 
- .---..- -
2. "Corpus enim per ee communis dedioat esse sensus; cui nisi prima fides 
fundat a valebi t, haud erlt oocultis de reDus quo referentes oonfirmare 
animi quioquam queamus .. " Lucretius, ..!?!. .!!!.• .E:!!•, i, 423•426. 
3. Bailey's expression. cr. Lucretius,£!!. r .er. ~ •• I, 53 (Prolegomena). 
4. Epiourus called it )1'0£..Vcrl:. J{yyoux t_ • Cr. Locke, ECHU 1 I, ~7; 
Leibniz, NEBU, 43. 
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But it has e. derived truth rounded on sense experiences which are immediate 
and, therefore , direct truth, though a() .. 0 yos .1 
- ) 
The great asset : ~hich was bequeathed to the philosophy of 
Aristotle by t hose empi:rloi.l materialists was the notion of 'Nihil est 
in in1Jelleotu quod non prius in sensu, ~2 which is peculiarly shared dth 
the psycho l ogy of Stoic philosophers in their theory of 'tabula~·· 
But they avoided the arsument of how those sensible objects are aequired 
through senses in our mind as images or i deas or as concepts. In other 
words , neither psychological study of these faculties of the mind nor 
epi stemological study of the conditions or forms or sense-perception were 
done by the se materialists. 
In short , we can point out some of their views concerning 
sensus connnunis as follows; 
(a) Th~ did not discuss the raoulty of $ynthesis by which the data 
of sense a re combined and distinguished, by which we are conscious of our I 
I mental aots, by which we imagine and remember. 
(b) They did not draw any dividng line between 
61'S ) and intellect ( v o iJ S' ) as psychical entities. 
sensibility (•l''f()7- I 
But a bipartite di vi- I 
sion of the soul of ID '}oytK£v (which is 
1 
J{.>.oycKt~V{which is distributed all over the 
) 
' placed in the thorax) and ~
body) in Demooritus seems to 
ha~ ant icipated tho tripartite division of Flatonia psychology. 
1. Bailey 1 GJl.E , 384. 
I 
" ,; .... , / 11 / · /} ... , ., ' ,\ /~ ) r .... ~ / ,, 2. oure .ui cnooo<vottGVO$' M~~v 0Ut;f€V aJ.- ,U.o( r:;t.. 'if'u; ~vt.o( • 
Aristof e I De an.' 432a 7. Aleo "sense is reoept ve 0 sens e forma I 
apart from their matter, as wax receives the imprint of the signet-ring 
apart from the iron °~ gold of Whioh it is made. 11 Atistotle, De an. 
1 
424a 17ff. --
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\c) Their notion or ¢c~.vro.o[o.. is not the power or reproduction , 
-but merely the presentative faculty, by which things appear, or present 
themselves, to us in ordinar,r perception. Democritus even held that the 
'secondar.r qualities• (as they were oalled by Locke) have no objective 
existence: they are only affections of our sensibility aooording as it is 
qualitatively altered.l 
(2) The Interpretation of Plato. 
(1) The Parts and Functions of the Mind. 
Plato often discourses about the soul in his writings but he 
ne ver attempted to write a treatise such as Aristotle's De Anima. When-
ever he set about writing something on the soul, it is colored by de scrip· 
tiona, partly mythical and religious, partly ethical. 
Plato's psychology has two tripartite construotionJ the three 
parts I (,ye /2 7 ) and three faoul tie a 
a . ihe Three parts of the soul. 
Parts 
1. Cognition or Re~son 
(Rational power~ ( vo;rro1. c( v • 
2) D \,' 6'"TL Kd' l( ) , 
' 2. onation ' 
i'opos Organ 
head brain 
thorax heart 
l dvvcfyc-tc ) of the soul. 
I 
Biological Application to 
distri?utionl the state2 
man 
animal and 
man 
counsellors 
or . the state 
auxiliaries 
\Sensitive power) 
. ( eld;yoe=t.cfl~ ; ) 
I 3 . Fe eling or APpetite abdomi• liver plant, traders3 
(Nutritive powe~) nal seoj animal and 
jl ~----<_e_)~--t_& _ ·~-u~?_r_,_~_tv._)~t-i_o_n __ ~l------~-ma-n--------~------------~ 
1. ea.re t GTEC , 256. . 
2. This distinct ion of the orders of' the natural kingdom was not di stinol 
= ~ __ ly m~rked or attended to by Plato as by Aristotle. 
II 
16 
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As is shown in this H st, the three psychological e l ement s 
I 
I 
' a~e put in corresponding struoture ~or the St ate. But these are not faou l- 11 
rea l ent iti es in the psyoho .. physi oal ">hole . 
b, The Three Faculties of the Soul. 
1'hey consti tu.te 
II 
'I 
I' 
But i n ~lato•s ps,yohology the 1facul t 1es 1 are certain process 
o f the soul dete~lned by the obj ect to which they are directed or the 
results thereof. The relation of the modes of apprehension (faculties 
of the soul) and the modes o f being (objects of app8ehension) is shown 
in Chapter XXIV of Republ ic in the following scheme: 
l Faculties or !Modes or Appre- .. !Modos of 6 I the soul hension Be1EE_ I ~~~~--------+~~~------ ----~---------------------1 1 
a . Coneeptual Intellect ( vo Dr ) The C-ood 
knowledge or , r 1 Intelli-('£-rrto·n{ti-11J. ) Knowl edge ( vo {o,s-) Forms (~.,t~.:J gihl e 
17 I ' world ~ Thinking ( Jt:vou~ ) Mathematica l ( vo'7 ro'v 
objeots(,uaB-•zt<anK~ v=- v o> ) b. Opinion 
L46~o< ) Belief ( ..,-( c>r t ~ )\-luv=:r..-1s1:n·Lo~.l•e.-1!'t"'n"nl:n~g~ ... s~~.....Jf==:::::=:::~4 
( 6W',K4. To<: ) ·1 World of <.1 
c . Sense- percep- 1 ( , / .- appearance 
tion(A;;r.9.,61~~ Imagination E-tXa..ot o< ) Ime.ges(~~xoYc-r ( r3par6v 
7 I ,;.ivos:) 
I 
Continued from Page 15. 
8. Plato, !!!.•, 77b and ReJ?., IV, 44lb; 523a ff. 
4. This olassifioat1on of the soul' s parts in Pl ato "Yrhich e.re separated 
into existenti ally distinct units with distinct corresponding anato• 
mical organs, is ethiao-tal&ol9gically determined . Whereas Aristotle' 
is biologically det e rmined. C:f':. H8.IIllll0nd1 11'. · .. iJtriii. 
6 , Pl ato, P'!'.E,•, VII , 509- 533. 
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t oulties r not shoer oh nic 1 po ers of th ,~oul . - --·~-
1'h y re r ' 'Char pro groa or oqulring tho lmo 1 dge of truth . 
1heae lli ar_rchiaa l rr ·omont of the ~oul is more ethi o•t loologieal 
th_n p . yohologio 1. 'l'hos r .. ostly th listi or human n fro abov , 
o r d duoti rran;., ant of the f cul ties of human :i.nd. · ho ver, th r 
re .e r ' 1 pas gc in Pl to•s dialo w 1oh pr•· -nt more pir1cal 
nnly ds or p yohte pht"> ona s ·oh . lt soe:ns to be a contr dio~ory 
~ttt pt to inv& tigat :r~l to' thaory fro an empiric 1 et nd int. »ut 
j u t as thare r no empi r1c1.. .. ts who can r ejoct all th ration 1 activiti c 
of the oul . at oev(~r , so it i ~& wit h r ttonaUsts. *"o Otln t r . c in th 
di logues or r l to 8 empi r ic 1 an ly~t s r p .. y ch1o ph no ena . There-
fore , these points should be otod, b fore we tart an an l ysis of r r i stotl 
( 1 i J 1'ho Co n Sensible • 
In th tu ... we i'ind t •!l f'ollo :tng r ument: 1) we do not 
at "' perc i 
through one s ae e cnnrw·t; perc iv thr ough no'th ra2 3) conse ntly, 
i ' e know eo m thing ut both und nd a color , it cannot be known 
throut;h scs . r1o k:no'l'" m.e..ny suoh things t :h e:.t a re C011tmon to t s nse-
o r gan : the..t they e.ro, tha t t hey are di fferent from on nnother, that 
botn ero o thine:o c,v d. that , ch is onf.' , etc. Pl ato en r a te tr~ 
in th o have the thout;ht in e nsin .. o1tn.d snd co l or th t: 
1. "soo ., ; Just consi9,or·; ·hioh nn. r is mor oorreot, th t our .yes r 
that by 1ch (W ) s <' or t h t through hich ( Jc. ' o7J ) e soo , 
etc ... ? "'hoaot~rough th \ J , } !Ev ), I think, re.th r ·than by 
tham \ o'l'5' ).•' Plato , 'l'he ot;~ ""lS:t'6•18ie. 
c iv t hr 1 1 rin , oto. •• '1 Plato , Theaot., 186 • 
-=- - - =--
2 . "Soc.; It is 1 poB .... ibl to perca1 , througb one sen e what you p roeive j 
through n:noth.er; for instnnoA. , to peroaiva throu- h aight "Wh. a-e you per• L 
3 . "So<l.: 'l'h n if you h :ve ny thought bout both of thaD togeth r , you 
ould not h • a p roept i on about both tog~ther ithe r through one organ 
~ --or~through-the=othe~ ·to~~·•~•~,c=U6• ... -- _ _ _____ _ 
- I ---
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1) i ndi "Vi dual sense (sound, oolor) exist,l I 
2) that each is different from the other and the same as itself 2 , 
'I 
3) t hat both together are two and eaah separately is one, 
I 
4) that we can observe whether t hey are like ' or unlike each other , ,, 
5) that the t wo , sound and co lor, are bitter or not, oan be gained II 
by anothe r sense organ. i .e. through the tongue. 
I How can we know these ? According to Plato, the soul appr~ I 
hends t hem through itself' without any sense-organs. Being and ~1ot-being, ;: 
,I 
likeness nnd unlikeness, number, identity and diversity, unity and plural- 'I 
I ity , vhe odd and even, et c., etc., are not apprehended through sensee, but 1 
through the soul alone. The soul views some things by itself directly and 11 
othe rs t hrough the bodily f aculties. Beside a, the soul e..pprehends the noble ij 
and tha base, the good and the bad; not through the senses, but by oalou-
lati ng in herself the past or present in relation to the ~ture. All men 
and animals !'rom ·the moment of birth haTe by nature sensations 'V'Jhioh pass 
th rough the body and reach the soul; but to compare these sensation s in 
relation to Being' and expediency comes with difficulty and is attained 
-· . 
by education. It is impossible to attain truth and know it without attain-
ing Being~ knowledge does not consist in affections of sense because we 
1. Existence of' the sensibles by proper sense organs. 
2. Judgment of the unity of sense and comparison of heterogeneous senei• 
bles. Cf'. ~ri stotle, ~ !!!!.•• 425b- -1 27a. 
3. For Pl ato, Being does not mean t he outer object of cognition . It be-
longs to the realm of Ideas which is the prino iplb of ease and essen-
tie. . 
I 
II 
,, 
I 
!I 
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II 
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cannot by them at tai n Being . It is only by reasoning about sensations 
that this is possible. 
\·iii) Sensation, r•e:!IIOry , Imagination and .Keoollection. 
The further empirical analysis of mental operations oen be 
f ound in the Philebus ,l in which Plato goes more into detail and distin-
guished (a) sensation, (b) memory, (c) imagination and td) recollection. 
When the a ffections of the body do not reaoh the soul, the state of t he 
soul is said to be nsenaibility or unconsoiousness.2 When the affeotions 
of t he hody are communicated through the body to the aoul, there is 
seneat io n. The retention of such a sensation is memory, its non-retention, 
the fading of memory, i s fo rgetting . The recovery of lost memories by t he 
s oul without the aid of the body is r ecollection. Also the memory is a 
scribe or recorder. ,hat it records a re propositions and opinions; t he 
ima .ination is a painter whose gl owing pict ure s excite hope for the tuture. 
I•'u r ther in Philebus the illustration of waxen block is employed for the 
explanation of sensation as an impression from without, like the print of 
a seal upon wax, o.nd the memory as the retention of such impre•sions.4 
\iv) The Limit s of ~ensation and Intellect~ 
In the Republic,5 Plato tells us about the limits of sensation 
1. Plato, Phileb., 33o•34c. 
2. Stoic conception of •tabula rasa. • 
3. Pl ato , ... hileb ., 38e-40b • 
4 . Pl ato , Phi leb., 191e; 197e. 
5 . Pl ato , Rep., 523a ff . 
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and reason. Sense, he says, is sufficient where & thing does not tend to 
pass into or be confused Ii th its opposite; 'here the data t end to beoome 
confused, sense is insu f ficient and wa must appeal to intellect . ~1;ha.t 
s~nse perceives confUsedly thought thinke distinctly and in isolation. 
Sense at the best can only give opinion, but r eason end true opinion are 
disti.not because: 
They are different i n origin and unlike in 
natt,.re. The on€l is engendered in us by in-
struction, the ot he r by persuasjon; the one 
ls ever a.ccornprmied by right understanding, 
the other is without understanding; the one is 
not ·t.o be moved by persuasion, the other y ields 
to per suasion; true opinion we mu st admit is 
shared qy all men, but rea son by the gods alone · 
and a very small portion of mankind .1 
F'o r Plato, sense and thought are concerned 1 ith different 
objects, the particular and the universal. As is mentioned ab ove, 
Protagoras und Heraoli t1;s held that sensible thing; s are always rela.tiye 
and no aue.lity belongs to anything E.!!:~· bec:ausc the p£•.rtioul a r of 
sense are in constant flux. The sensibles a re always in tho p r o ces s o f 
becoming , not baing. Vihen an object comes i n conta ct ith our sense-organ 
and interaction takes pleoe, a sensation arises in the organ and simul-
taneously the object becomes poesessed of a certain qualit7 . But the 
sensation in t he organ a nd the quality i n the object are results Which 
are produced only by the oontaot and last only es long a s it last s. In 
this, Plato agrees with Eeraolitus and Protagore.a, ao far as it relates 
to sense and sensiblee.2 But f'oF Pl a to the lnf'e r enoe and oo n clus:i.on 
were formed not from the side of tho presentations of sense-perception 
but from the :infallible fact of our having such a thing s 'knowledge', 
1. Plato,~· · 5le. 
2. Ar istotle, Metaph., 987a 32; l016b 12-17. 
w lioh he firmly be lieved , and so f r t he object of t h knm• ledge ru.ls'C be 
Ln i ntelligible object a nd a universal . 
Ac co rdingly, fo r .t lato , the k:novrj.ng or learning proooss of 
kno ledge or universa l being i s nothing but the recovery o i' those whioh 
we have gained befo re our birth and a t birth lost. '.L'herefore t ho se i deas 
should h ave been in us and we should try to regai n tho se l o st ideas by 
l ea.rnin ( o r recolleot ion) .• l 
It is natural, t herefore., that f lato did not detonnine the fa-
oulty o f peroeiving th oomrnon s ensibles in sense-perception. The only 
' passag s which treated the problems of Aristotle 's inner sense are \a ) 
t he discussion of hetcro~encous qualities acquired 'thr ough' the differ ent 
s en e orga.?J. n and united i nto one or •iiscriminated as heterogeneous2 and 
(b) the discussi on of self-consciousnes ~ in 1)roving the existence of a. 
science of i t self i n Charmides •S 
In summariz i ng these, 
(a) Plato denied synthesis to sense and ascribed it to thought or i ntel-
leot ; 
~b ) Sense o rgans are inatrwment s o r channels of the soul' s activity& 
1. rlato, ~·· 72e-76d. 
2 .. Plato, Theaet., 184b•l86e. 
S.. ;~socra't!_e s. •~·~p -os'Ef the.t tllere is a kind of vision whioh i s not; like ordi 
nary vi sion, but a vision of itself and of other sorts of vision , and 
of the defect of them, which i n seeing sees no color, but only itee lf 
aH o thor so rts o f vision •• • •• " •lato , Charm. , l67aff'. 
========~=====================!~~~~ 
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(c) l'hou,h he deni e d synthesis to sense, he recognized the funct ion of' 
syntheGi a r.. s nece s sary fo r the co-ordi,tnation and systematization o r t h6 
data of sense; 
td) The content of the ~11 ~sensible a ( 7~ .!foc...vC:. ) as objects of t he 
mind acting through the sensation ( (){Z68__f '?c r~ ) is~ i) Being and 
• ot-being \ oJo(o< xc/'C. T~ e? &1vctl , :1.i) Likeness and nlikeness( -r~ ~OLOV 
I I 
k<X~ T'O d<v~o_; ~ v ), iii) ne and 1.1any ( ~V Kd~ 7toMcf ), iv) the 
Beautiful and the Ugly ( T~ .kol)...;;v Kol f: T~ oc~Pbv), i') t he Good and the 
) I 
1 . e & Page 19 . Also Plato, ~~·• 186 • 
I 
I 
II 
II 
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TE I II 
niS1'0 T LE 
A. Dev op ent of the Oonoept1on or 1'th Common . w 
Th noti on or ''the Co . ..... / on" ( ro KOC vov ) in Pl ato ' s p 
cholo~ s nh r g rl by Ari totle t o the ~onooption of .. common s noibl •tl 
to ldgni fy a. ttp ci to sp . t in the psyoholo . ioal process of sense-percep-
tion. "'o:r ristotl , tho aot of sense-perception is not completed i n 
\,. 
t he poriphora.l i'ivo t~ons -organs , but onl y in th 11cent r .1 en " ( lo 
xcfft,ov aZ~79,efQv. ). 1'he•• a re i'lv peripher 1 org n s o r sen se.,. , 
t hey- re eye. e , toJ!f;ue and t hroat, noao , kin and fl~ eh . :1.11ose a re 
3timulat d by objects in the xt~rnal ~orld ~hich by oont ot ith t he 
_ork o oh n e \ ~A~ .~.~cvot> ) i n it.2 Th contact h i'f.ected 
1. 
2. n th1a ~en that l ter medi an-al thinkers named these part-
of sense as "exterior tt or n xtur al u b ooalH!a l') f t his 
i di .. ta nt t ith the objective "A"'rld. But Pistotle . ploys . 
mor f ithtully to hie doctrine of psychological f a.cultiea, C. "' 
"peoi 1 n en (j;J£q ~2((~ 0;~ ) which w s t r n~lnted into Latin 
e « ensue ;eropriua . " JJO~n istotle en Tho a Aquina s · ploy 
bot h sin . 1M' tbrm nd plural forms tor the xpresRione of prop r 
ens , :...-teYior n ,, .tnt_ rior sens , but not for common eenso . 
o.lthou h r ist tle use:~ t ' t o 1 common en ibloe in plural. 
1\ I 
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through a medium whi ah tr~am;ts -a stimulu-s from the sense-ohjeo~ -~o-;~e - ---:1 -
peroeiv"ng organ, and the change which the stimulus works in the peripheral j 
I 
organ is furthe r transmitted by the blood or sense-duct to the sensorium 
( central organ) . 
On examining the psychology of Aristotle, three factors are to 
II be taken into account in each stage of sense-perception: (a) the organ, _ 
I (b) the object or thing sensed, (o) the medium ot transnission. 
I 
In the case of visual perception these factors are the eye, the 
thing seen and the diaphanous or translucen-t medi'UJIL, whether the latter be 
liquid or e.tmospherio .l 
Xo each of the individual sense belongs the functions of' appre-
• ( , I ( './& I ) 2 bending a. part1oula.r quality tC!C o v t:Xlvi<J ro v • In vision, only 
color is sensed; i n hearing, only sound; in ~ell, odour; in t aste, flavor 
and in touch, the qualities of body as body (hardness, etc.). These are 
all sensation-qualit ies , but they are not percepts, the perception of the 
I object a.S a whole. By means of' sight, .!.•!.•, we have the sensation of' green, 
I but not an olive itself. An olive is a percept, green is a sensation. An 
11 olive is made up of several ideas, of hardne ss, taste, color, form, magni-
'1 
tude, etc., and these are unified in a particular thing and they constitute 
it a single concrete objgct, "olive." The peripheral organs of touch, 
tast e . and sight furnish us with several ideas or qualitite s belonging to 
a concrete t hing. Thus each single sense judges \ kf ( v t-c...v ) of its pro-
1. This physical explanation of' vision and other sense-organa ia almost 
entirely bequeathed from Atomistic views of Empedocles and Democritus. 
Only their material theory did not really touch the problem which they 
et out to solve; it establish , s a oonneotion between object and per-
cipient, but it does not really tell us what thought and sensation, as 
we know them, are. cr. Bailey, GAE, 164. 
1 2. De an., 418a lOft. 
II 
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II sound.l 
and is not deceived as to the fac~ that there is a color or a 
But in order that these various qualities are brought together for 
knowledge and seen to inhere in a single object, it is necessary to think 
of some unif'ying function which is called by the names of the central or 
aommon sense; it is only then tttat e. percept is formed in our mind. fhe 
function of sensation, ~~erefore, belongs to the peripheral or external 
.. 
senses in so f ar as they mediate t he qualities of an external object to 
the inner sensorium or common sense. And perception2 is one of the funo-
tions of' t ho cent ral sense. 
B. The Common Sensibles. 
In the second chapter of De Anima3 Aristotle describes three 
I di fferent sensible objects: two of vrhich are perceived in tham.selves or 
directly. ~nile the third is perceived per accidens or indirectly. Of the 
first two the one is the special object of a particular sense, the other 
an object oommon to all the senses. i.e., the obje'ct of perception, or 
oommon sense. And he employs the term "common sensibles " (xcwv?x- cv26"G;zr~) 
for the objects of common sense. 
According to Aristotle, these common sensibles are (i) motion, 
(ii) rest, {iii) number, (iT} figure or f orm, (v) aize or magnitude and 
(vi) time.+ lh~se qualities are not the special objects -of any single · 
1. De an., 418a. , 410a. 41Gb and 429a, 432a. 
2. Sans •• 449a Sff. 
s. De an., 418a 7ff . 
4. De an., 418a 17, 426a 14•30; De mem ., 450a 10. 
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I oeived by touch e.a well as by sight . In De aensu,1 Ari .stotle adde rough• 
n6ss, smoothness, nnd sharpness and bluntness in solid bodies a the common 
fUnction of sight and touoh .2 The statement is quite true of number nnd 
unity:3 each sense perceives "one• object, nnd number is made up of units. 
It is also true of motion. But magnitude and :tigure oo.n hardly be ee.id to 
be directly peroeived except by sight and touch. The fact is that no on~ 
of these common sensibles is peroeiTed by one sense only; and all the 
senses, in various combinations, at one time or another contribute to make 
them knol'lll. 
In oompa r i son to Aristotle • s conception of the common sensible a 
\ . / 
Pl ato's oonoepti.on of the common noti ons \ 101. Jt"DLvo< ) which are put in 
pairs f 'being' and not-being; likeness and unlikeness; identity and 
difference; unitlr end plurality; the odd and. even, etc.' 4 indicates that 
he wns ·thinking of much higher structure of the mental activity. For Plato 
these ~~mrnon sensibles are not perceived by sense but directly apprehended 
by soul itself which may be indirectly apprehended by ~ ristotla 1 s intellect 
though directly by sense. 
c. The Functions of the Sensus Communis. 
\,i) As a power of apprehending the corumon sensibles. 
1. ~·' 44 2b 5. 
2. cr. Locke's primary qualities& space o r extension. figure. rest, and 
motion . Locke, ECRU, 158. 
3 . e n . • 425a 19ff. 
4. Plato , Eth. ~., l142a ?.7;. lso Thoaet •• l86a. 
II ,, 
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As it is shown above, for Aristotl. e , t he a ppr ehension of "the 
common" must be done by s ense , b4foause they are sensibles.l And t hey a re 
II not apprehended by the particular sense s like sight or touc h • but by the 
II 
II 
II 
!i 
II 
common po1'1e r that i s associat e d with al l the partioula.r s ens e \. -r(y-t 
Tc.vY 
~ ii ) A8 a powe r of sol f *oonsoiousneas. 
e also recognize particula r sensations as belonging to our-
s e lves and can ho l d t hem u p befo re ou r mi:rids as something knoTm to u s . e 
II 
I know that we see . We a r e c onscious that we s~e and hear. I n other word a, 
I 
I 
II 
II 
II 
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we a re conscious of a s ensation. I t is , a ccording to Aristo tle, by means 
of the cent r a l sense . Thus, oonsciousne ss3 come s to be anot her funct ion 
of t he common sense . 
~iii) As a p r i nc iple of the unity o f s ensation. 
As i s mentioned above, in every sense there is a power "V~ihioh is 
pecu li ar t o it and another po e r which i t h as in common with others, i.e . 
a kind of common power t hat is associated with all t ho particular senees, 
by virt ue of which we are con scious o f our ensing und discriminate sensa-
tion s from ea ch other. fbus sensatiun is unitary and the master-organ of 
1 . De~ • • 4~6b 15. However thie a r gument i s fallin i nto letitio ~rincipi 
%1 s does not ~ive any proper reasons 'Why the apprehens on of t e oommo 
mu st .be in the funct i on of s ens e-percept i on r at her than i n i nt •lle otua l 
a c t i vity . 
~ . Somn ., 55a 3. Here Ar ist otle i nterprete sleeping and awaki ng a s an 
"""BJT"eotion ( 7Tof &o> ) of t h i s common s en s e and he att r i but e s c ommon sen se 
to t he facu!ty~a n se rath er than intel l ectual power, b ee use s l eepin 
and a: klng a r e found ln all an imals . .l:fut still t h is is not a pr o per 
r~ason o f a s um5.nt; comm n ~Sense as sensit ive a c iti v i ty. 
3 . De an . , 425b 12ff ; De ens •• 455a 16f f . 
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&nd makes tham possibl e to start t heir own sensitive activity. It ~as in 
. " this sense that llristotle called common sense as r1the first aense" t.z:2_ 
I
I 
..... "1...-:' / \2 1 rT/V() )Toy owL,MIOVJ or I . I 
j and the f aculty of common 
"t he central sen se" 
I 
II 
I ~ 
II 
II 
sense as "the first 
z
1
,.owro y c;t(~ro-rbV') or . "principl e (beginning) of sans t ionn ( cT<Bi!f 
7 r cd <l€f' o ~ $" ) • 3 Co no erni:ug this po ~nt • an e.xpl ana t ion o £ ·rhomas 
Aquinas will be adequate a4 "l~e interior sense i s not called common by 
predication , as if it were a genus, but as the common root ~communis radix) 
and principle of the exteri or senses . ~ This function of the common sense 
is very important . Because this i s not gained by the inductive analysis 
of the common aenaibles but comes to be apprehended as fo rmal condi t ion o f 
all sensitive activity, though Aristotle did not refe r to it . 
(iv) As a Discretionis Principi um. 
The indivi dual senses furnish u s l'tith color, sound, etc •• but 
1. ~·· 465a . 
2. It is in this sen se that Locke employed t he ter.m, primary qualities . 
3 . Somn ., 466a, 468a, 464&J .llaem., 460a, 46la. 
- -
4. "Sensus int erior non dicitur communis per praedioationem. sicut genus. 
e d siout conununis radix, et principium axteriorum. ,. 'l'homas Aqui nas , . 
Summ. thaol., I, 78, 4, Rasp . ad primum . 
_j 
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it is not t heir funct ion to disorimi nate, .!•.[• betweon sweet and 11rhite , or II 
I 
'l'his is a f unction of judgrnont,l and I 
.t·he discrimi nation betwoo I 
to differGntiate degrees of bitter . 
II ··-it is ascribed by Ari totle to the common sense . 
true and fa l se, between real and unre~l in our perceptions is made not by 
the peripheral sensPs, but by the oent r E!.l sense . 
1'he s nsation, because tt is only a f a0t and an a. senso ... p o c~ss 
pronounces no judgment, is always true2 . but vhen the sensation is predica~ 
e d of something and a judgment 1s expressed, error is po s si ble. It is tpe 
i nte rna l o r central sense that performs thi s offio~ of judgment in t he 
share of perceptual kno\vledge, and it is , t herefo re, to the centr al sense 
alone that , strictly speaking , truth and falsehood in thi s spher e can be 
ascribed .~ 
(v) Other ~unctions of the Sensus Communis. 
Further, sleep,4 ima.gine.tion ,5 memo ry,6 ~.nd dree.m,1 in so f a r 
as th~3 signi fy the interruption of consciousness or the continue life 
and movement o f re sidual sense- perceptions, are functions of the sensorium, 
or cent r al sense. 
l. De an ., 426b l4ff. cr. Thomas .Aqulnt?.s, Sum. theol. , I, 18, 4, d seeun-
-uffi~ ~erefo re the discerning judgment (disoretionis prineipium) must 
oe assigne to the common sense; to which, as to a c~amon te~ (sicut 
ad mmunem terminum) all apprehensions or the sonses must be referred 1 
and by hioh~ again, all the .intentions of the senses a r e pe r ceivedJ as 
when someone sees tha-c he sees." 
·2 . De an., 427b 11 ; 428a 12. 
3 . Thomas Aqu i nas dhtinguished animal juagaent \Vis aestimativa sive inten 
tionos) from human rea soning power (vis cogita~iv ). Sum. tKteoi. I, 
79, i . Respondeo . 
4. ~·· 454a 23; 456u 1. 
5. Insomn., 460b 17. 
6 . ~· , 45la 17. 
7. Insomn., 458b l. 
I 
In summari zing thes;;-· various functions of' the central or 
s nse , w ean poi nt out t he fo llowing e i ght : 
· (1 ) The cognition of the ' "common sansibles," i.e., motion, rest , number , 
figure, size, time , etc.; 
\2) The unifi o ~ion of the primary aensibles, or the complete ct of sense 
pero. ption; 
{3) Conaoiousnesu, or the perception that 'lire perceive; 
. 
\4) The suspension of consciousness, or sleep; 
(5) Jud ment, in so ff r as judgm·::rrt applies to the comparison, contrn.st 
and di scr imination of the delivero.noes o f senses ; 
(6) I::aagina.t i on, or residual . sen 3o-i n1ages; 
( 7) emory ( i noluding remi niscence) or t he volunta.r:r and involuntary r e-
production of sensations; and 
(8) Its cont ent a s the potentiality of roason. 
D. The Perception of f ime. 
For Aristotle, Time is perceptible. There is no imperceptible 
timol. In De Sensu he deals with the problem of the possiW.i~ of e:xperi-
encing t o simultaneous sonsations at one and the s&me mom0nt of time. 
1'his i a i n the discu ssion ofthe power of the fusion of aGnsations in the 
Sensu e Communis. 
en one perceives one ' s !elf or !omething 
e lse in continuous time, it. is impossible for 
one to be then unconsc ious that one is; but if 
there is in continuous time a momen-c of' such 
dur ation that it is altogether tmperoeptible , 
i t is evident that one would then be uncon-
scious of one•s own exist9noe, or would not 
1. !..!.!·. 448b 15 . 
30 
=="'--··~ 
~l 
-_I __ 
kno whother or not one see s nnd peroeives.1 
:rhus the perception of' time is closely related ~1ith self-con-
sciousness. And he explains t he.t the perception o f temporsl dura ~ion is 
on l y pos sible i n spatial extension or movement or numerical series. Furth• 
h r ised e. qua ... tion about the relation of oonseiousness ~:o.nd several simul-
taneous sensa ions: 
Is it possibl e "t;ha,. th~ st*nsatione be 
sinlUlt eneous in the sense the.t they are 
experiqnced in d.i. f'fer~n·t parts of the 
, .. so.ul. and no't!, in one indivisible part, 
though by part ti whioh are indivisible in 
the sense of' formin~ a continuous who le22 
Re re Aristotle e.numera.tes series · of these que stions "Uch e. s 
the perception of the different co lors in one obj ~ot ~ s _a <hole or the per-
ception of' the same ob,ject which comes tnrougn btl ~ye:.l, ato.3 And he con-
oludes t hat there must be eome unitary principle in _the soul , wher eby it 
perce ive thintr;s as holes.4 And this function is ascribed to the !'common 
sense, " where the Tarioua ·experiences of the individual senses are fused 
into a whole o r t he percept . 'l'hus the notion of nsimultaneous " i:s cloeely 
relat e d with the oo_~oeption o-f eyn~hetio po er of the soul. 1'hus Aristotle 
ass rts that regardles s of the · presence of' our oonaoiouaness, time as S1llQh 
exists . 5 But the perception of time itself derives from the combined ex-
I perienees of perception of the pre sent , expectation of' tho future and 
-1 . Sena . , 448a 20- b 6. 
2. ~·· 448b 18•20. 
3. ~· · 448b ?l-449e. 2. 
4 . "'"'~~n s., 449n ll-12. 
-
5. __!l!.•, 448b 15 . 
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memory of the past .1 l'herefore memory and time are perceived by the same 
organ.2 And the organ h the central organ or heart .S 
Also Aristotle defines time as the measure or number of motion, 
but time cannot exist apart from mind, as number cannot exist apart from 
a calculator, and the sole calculator is mind.• At the beginning of ~ 
Anima , Chapter 1hree, he tried to reduce all the common properties in 
motion. 
.illl these properties we perceive by 
means of motion, e.g.~ magnitude is per-
ceived by motion. Form 1 s a sort of 
magnitude, and rest we perceive from the 
absence of motion. Number is perceived 
by the negation of continuity •••• s 
From these we can understand the following itema en Aristotle's 
conception of l'imea 
(1) Time is the measure or number of motion. And motion ie a 1.\mda.mental 
quality of common senaibles. 
{2) Time cannot exist apart from mind. 'When we percein something, we 
perceive it as a pre sent perception or as a past recollection or as a 
fUture expectation . Time cannot be separable from human consciousness. 
~~) There is no imperceptible time, though we can be unoonscious of it. 
{4) Time is perceived by the common sense, because the perception of ttme 
is included in the perception of the common sensibles. 
1. ~· 449b 10•15. 
2 . ~·· 449b 10-15. 
3 . Mem. , 45la 17. 
4. Phys., ·219a 10J223a 16J De ooelo, 279a 14. 
6 . De an., 425a 18-20. 
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Conclusion to this chapter. II 
For Aristotle, the aim ot all soienoe is to form an intelligible 
I 
unive r se by discovering the universal in the partioulars••particulars whi.ch 1 
are the primary and only substances or existences, but which have no exis-
tence apart from the universal which is their "form" or the class (kind) of 
their existence. Such universals are concepts .formed by the intuitive 
reason on the basis of repeated "sensation, ,; which rise to "memory!' and then 
to "experience," ot the same kind or thing. 
Then how about the conceptions o t psychic acti vi tieet Are they 
also the ,, forms"t aut the "forms " are acquired by those psychic activities. [ 
I f ·:.:•they are forms, they are the .forms which auat r: be acquired by the same II 
I forms. Thus aristotle' 8 analysi 8 ot the common sensible& leads to the notio~ 
I of consciousnes s . At t he same time. the -common sensibl~s can be perceptibl~ 
I I by means of mot i on, th e measure and number of which ia, for Aristotle, time . 
Thus he not j ced that t hose three , consciousness , time and t he power of 
!i sensus communis are inseparable and acquired by our experience. And , as 
he tried t o define the peripheral senses ~_, the organic functions , so he 
sought for t he runc~ion of sensus communis in the p~sical organ. But 
neither his biologica l a ttempt o t locali,zing nsensus oommuni s '' nor t hat 
of descdbing it in the metaphysical t (•rms, were successful. 
nowever, we cannot deny t hat nis anal ysis of sensus communis 
opened a new. field of the study of sense-perception. 
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CHAPTER IV 
· H 0 Jl A S A Q.:u I H A S 
A. Thomas Aquinas' Pw,ycholog ioal Scheme. 
Aristotle likened the process of acquiring knowledge or exter-
nal objects to the impression or a seal on wax. ~ut there knowledge is two 
fold: something oompo sed of matter and form, ~n the one hand, and something 
which is pure form, on the other. Psycho logically t he first comes into 
mind through e xte rnal senses. Ihe second comes through·,.the inte rnal tunc-
tion of the mind. In both instances, it is t he fona that makes t he object 
what it is. 'l'homas adopted thi s view of Aristotle . For· hi knowledge is 
a vi t a l act in which form i mpre see itself on the cognitive agent. l'he 
cognitive power p roduce s an intentional species which, dep nding on the 
nature of tho subject tha t r eceives i t , is either sensible or intelligible. 
In either c o.se, it i e an intentional form. and not natural form, which 
accomplishes the union of subject and object . 
:rhe intim.aoy or the union determines the perfection or ex• 
cellence of the knowledge. In een ,,e cognition, the intentional form is 
received into a materiel faculty. It 1 e still ooncrete end individual 
in character, since it is only parti.lly remoTed from matter. In intellec-
tual '' cognition, the intentional fo rm is received into an immaterial faculty. 
It is ab str act and universal in character, since it. ia completely removeil 
I 
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II from matter. 
II Concerning the division of the i'aoulties of' mind, Thomas 
I appropriated muoh trom Aristotelian psychology. In . Swilma ~heoiogioal 
it is shown in the following soheme. 
1. Veget ative power. 
a. Generative power 
b. Augmentative power 
c. Nutritive power 
2. Sensitive power. 
a. Exterior senses \i'i ve' senses) 
b. Interior senses (sensu~ communi.s, imagination, animal judgment, 
and memory) · 
3. Conation or appetite . 
4. !uovable power . 
5. Intellect or reason. 
B. Five Aspects of animal Knowledge or Sense-perception. 
According to Thomas,2 five things are required for the perteot 
sense knowledg whioh an animal should have: 
(1) Sense receives species from sensible things, and this pertains to the 
proper sense whioh is oalled external sense, i.e. one whioh has its own 
proper object, for example, sight, whose object is color. 
(2) The animal makes some judgment about the aenaible qualities received 
1. i~omas Aquinas, QDA, 167. All turther reterencea in this Chapter are 
to 1'homas Aquinas unless otherwise noted. 
2. ~· theol., I, 78, 1. 
l 
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1 and di stinguishes them one from another and this must be done by a power 
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to which all sensible qualities are related . This power is called Sensus 
Communis. 
(3) The species of sensible things which have been received must be re-
t a i n ed . No an animal needs t o apprahend sensible ·t hinge not only when · 
they a re present, but also after they have disappeared . And it is neoes 
that this a lso be ~ttributed to some power. For i n corporeal things there 
is one principle that reoehres, and another that reta ins, b&oe.use things 
-vlhich are good recipients a re somet i mes poor retainers.l This power is 
called imagination or 1phantasy.• 
(4) The animal must know certa in intentions which sense (i.e. the external 
sen ses ) does not apprehend, such a s t he harmful, the us9ful, 2 .. and so on. 
an, indeed, acquires a knowledge of these by investigation and by in-
terence, but other animals, by a certa in natura l instinct. For exampl e , 
the sheep flees naturally from the wolf as something harmful. l!enoe in 
animals other than man a natural estimative power is directed to thi s 
end. But in man there is a oogitati "9'8 power which collates particular 
intent ions. l'his is 'Why it is called both particular reason and passive 
intellect. 
1 I \5) It is necessary tht. t those t .hings mioh were t:l,-rst , apprehend ·d by sense 
' and conserved interiorly, be called again to actual consideratio~. l'his I 
1[ belongs to a .._ratiTe power, whioh operates without aey 1n'98stigat1on I 
I . in the case or oome animals, but with investigation in the case of 
II 
II 
1~ This power is called by Aristotle .(tcr , habitus, in Latin, from 
whi oh the oonoeption of habitudo ng inbetween potentia and actus 
oomp s. 
I 2, Sum, theol., 78, . 4, Reopondeo, 
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men. Therefore in men there ie not only memo~ but also remini scence, i.e. 
men oan seek s,yllogistically for a recollection of the past by the applica-
tion of individual intentions.! Moreover it was necessary that a power 
distinct from the others be directed to this end, because the activity of 
t he other sentient powers entails a movement from things to the soul, here-
a s the aotivi ty of the memore.tiw power entails an opposite movement from 
the soul to things. 
In short, five requirements for animal knowledge area 
1. Proper senses or external senses 
2. Sensus communis 
3. Imagination or phantasia 
4. Sense- judgment \via aestimati va) or Cogitative power 
5. Memory 
c. Sensus Communis. 
4s was described in Aristotle, the external senses are £'uno-
tionless as isolated powers or they work only in conjunction with an in-
ternal pov.er in which they are rooted and upon which they are dependent. 
This internal po~1rer l'ms called by .Aristotl e central sanae or common sense. 
Thomas accepte d this as one of the functions of his inte rnal sensea ~ sensus 
interior es) . Sensus communi s disorimi.nEtt es between those particula r 
perceptions •hioh wer e J'e oei ved by the extelnal senses and unites them 
into perceptual vholas . '.i:he act of OOIIU!lOn sen se, however, does not consist 
merely in the conjoining of diff erent sensations t o form perceptual wholes. 
1. Sum. theol ., l, 78, ~· 4. 
I 
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11~ synthetic power has muob more dg.nifioant role to play in th sena1• 
' t ~ vo oo ni tio • rthEm we etop and r fleet on th tter • eyery o bj ot that 
I 
fall und r th sen 8 is quantified nd looaliaed. l t he. definite patia 
and t wr 1 d. ion • l t alw~a xi st e and op r some-
time. llnd thee '"!'Y facta :lmmedi .tely surround it with oharaoteristicco 
th t ar~ not ntirely explioat ·d in te~ of colora, sounds, odor3, flavore, 
and gibl qual1t1 s. A ro e, for ex ple, 1a not merely red and t r ran 
it al hua surra 1 ext ndon, shnp , soHdity, a definite he and ev n 
a loc 1 ti nn tf it sw Ya in th breece. I!!Ong, for inste.noe , 1 not 
mer ly a seri a or uditory stimuli. .4t also has a defini te tempo , a eter, 
ocen .. s . d a r~yth • And non of th pa.t i e.l features or the rose a.nd 
none o£' t he t po ral obara t ri stioa of tho melody r perc ivod by any one 
or ·th outer sans lon • ··.'hey r e asp ct of th materiQ.l objeot that 
simult e sly ppe 1 to ever 1 external sen ea . If they ar e to be p r-
c ived, they uet be oomb1n d. quina a, th r efo re"' followi n the xamp;l.e 
of Ari totle, 0 lls th common aens1bles. 
eo . of this sp t1o-t poral aspect ot oon~mon aenaiblea, 
it might b uppo ed that oommon s n 1bles re th speo1:ty1n t otors or 
common n se. ut 
sensi l 9 
o nnot expect any such prop r 1' otor., in the common 
communis is po e r wherein ar •. . terminated nll 
the oh es of th out r en ea ••• It i i 
rnt:ni to h va ey proper obj~ ct th t is not th objeot of an external 
sen • 11], The differ no betw n the outer sense and common e se arises 
not rom di fforono ot propar and o n senaibles, but from a difference 
1. ====-- =--
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of the mode in which sensible objects affect the outer senses and common 
sense. 
i 
I D. The Comparison of Aristotle's Common (or central) Sense and the 
II 
I 
II ~I 
I 
Sensus Interiorea of Thomas Aq11inas. 
(a) The po er of' disoriminating and comparing the data of the special 
senses in Aristotle's Senaus Communis .is asserted equally by t homas. 
(b) But the content of the Common Seneibles \ -j-,j rro c.. vcf) which, for 
Aristotle, was listed aa fivel is not clearly stated in Summa Theologica. 
Thomas' desc ription of the Sensus Interiores was done from a more fUnctions. 
angle o f sense-perception. In Thomas• Commanta~ on Aristotle's De Anima 
he gives his interpretation of Aristotelian common sensibles. But the 
statement is almost entirely omitted in Summa Theologica. This seems to 
be rather important. I t proves that ~homas was already looking into the 
w~re subjective side of the power of human mind rather than for an objec-
tive analysi s of the qualities of the percepts which are r at her the subject 
matter of physics and metaphysics. 
(o) ln the aritioi&n of Aristotle's De Anima I I I, Thorruas attributed all 
the five common sensibles to the qualities of motion, as Aristotle explain-
ed. 
1. a. motion or movement; be. form or figure; o. number, d. time; e. 
magnitude or size, In addition to this, the privation of motion is 
listed as 'rest•. However, the enumeration of Aristotle's 'common 
sensible s t is not identical in De en., 418a 17 and in Mem., 450a 10. 
De an.a (1) motion, (ii) rest,~ number, (iv) figure, {v) size. 
Mem., (i) motion, (ii) form, (iii) number, (iv) magnitude, (v) tilite. 
I~ould be noticed that •ttme' is added in the study of ~emo r,y. 
ll =~ 
I 
39 
I 
I 
--------' c-
motion 
According to £hysion, (IV, Cl\p . xi) time is t he number of 
ith respect to befo r e and atter.l 'l'hh r a ised e fUrther question 
whether it has an objective or only a subjective existence, a p roblem 
which caused great hesitation vrhich is alao o.bservable in Ar istotle. 
For in interpreting time empirically, time is a kind of oontinuum composed 
of parts, being made up of a suooession of tnowa,' eome of which at arv 
given memente a re past, one present, and others future. 
lhe ense of t ime is derived from the 
ooneoiousness of t he flow of our inner ex-
porienoe e.n.d the change in our perceptions , 
etc •••• So the sleepers of Sardis are un-
avrare on awaken1.ng that any pedod. of t:l.me 
has elapsed, for they couple together the 
last ' now• of their former ·oonsciousneas 
with the first •now' of their awakening ex-
perience , · .nd so effect a continuity in their 
psychio life, totally oblivious of the inter-
ven ing gap. In the ea:me way, when we ·go to · .. . 
sleep in a dark place, where we are unable 
to see the changes of' illumination c aused by 
the motion of the heavens• we are unable on 
awakening to tell what time it is until we 
refer our calculation to celestial motions.2 
Our sense of time, thus, proceeds from the obsen-ation of 
motion, not HS auoh--the mere perception of the change taking ple.oe is not 
.. 
sufficient--but from the observation of motion referred to a before and 
after, both of which are essentially subjeo·tive conceptions. homas deri-
ve s tbaeofrom motion and accepts the Aristotelian definition, but he int•r-
prets it in a more objective sense. 5 
1. Aristoteles, Fhrs., 219a 10. 
2 .. Aristoteles, Phys., 223a 16. 
l 'he unity of time is t aken from 
3. Sum. theol., I, 10, 4J Sum. oontr. gent., 11, 35. 
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unity of motion of the first heaven, by which all oth r motions are mea-
===='-1;--
sured. Time stands to this first motion not only in the relation of 
measure to the thing meaaured, but also as an accident to its subjectum. 
Its objective character is; for 1homas , thus i ndiopensable and its unity 
assured . In relation to other motions it must be r egarded solely as a 
measure , for the multiplicity of mot ions is not referred to a multiplicity 
of times , but t o one time , the time of the first movable.l 
The problem of time and space i n connection with the dis-
cus sion of t he Common Sensibles of l.ri stotle and 1 th the oonoeption 
of :i.nternal sense of i'homas Aquinas wa s highly developed by z-ost•Scholastio 
philosophers. lba rapid advance of the physical and mathematical sciences 
which follo-wed the Renais sance and resulted in abandonment ot' t he old 
~olemio astronomy opened a n~ conception of the physical uniTerse, beside 
which the theo l ogical cosmol ogies of the Schola stics appeared like the 
c rud irn.e.ginations of children. Space and time, gr adually began to 
assume a philosophical importance which the Aristotelianism of the 
Middle Age s had denied them, until with Kant th~ were promoted to the 
forefront of the epi stemo l ogical battl~ . 
l. ~ theol . , I, lO, 6 . "Est vero rat ion unitati s temporis ••• " 
e . 
CH.A.PTER V 
THE DEVELOH.{ENT OF THE PROBLEJ! .AFTER THCJU.S AQUINAS 
.A.. Locke. 
(a) The Primary and Secondary Qualities. 
Although Aristotle examined the sensible qualities of external 
objects, he did not clearly point out whether these qualities (or the 
content of the sensationsj are in the external bodies or in our mind as 
ideas, Locke distinguished them in hhe analysis of ideas: (i) ideas or 
percepti ons in our minds; and (ii) modifications of matter (qualities) in 
the bodies that cause such perceptions in us.1 He discriminated idea 
(= nwhatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object 
of perception, thought, or understanding") and QUality (c "the power to 
produce any idea in our mind".) 2 Thus, for Locke, a snowball has the 
power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and sound (:qualities). 
The products of these powers in our mind are the ideas. Ideas are those 
qualities in the objects which produve them in us. 
1. Locke, ECHU, I, 168. All further references in Chapter V, .A.. are to 
Locke, unless otherwise noted. 
2. ~CHU, I, 169. 
- ---- - ---· 
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According to Locke, these qualities of bodies are divided into 
two groups: primary and seooncary. 
\i) Primar,r Qualities. 
For Locke, primary qualities are 
a. such as are utterly inseparable from the body, in what state soever 
it be! and 
b. such as in all the alterations and changes it suffers, all the for:oe 
oan be used upon it, it constantly keeps; 
c, such as sense .constantly finds in every particle of matter which has 
bulk enough to be perceived; 
d. and such as the mind finds inseparable from every particle of matter, 
th~ngh i ~Qssuthan to make itself singly be perceived by our senses. 
And he enumerates them: solidity, extension, figure, motion or 
rest and number. lhese qualities cannot be taken away from bodies by 
dividing ~hem into parts. 
lii) Secondary Qualities, 
()n the other hand, suoh qualities which 
a, in truth are noting in the objects themselves, but 
b. powers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities 
(bulk, figure, texture and motion)of t~eir insensible parts}, as colors, 
sounds, tastes, &c, are called secondary qualities, 
•.. · 
The dist j nction of these two qua;tities is somewhat similar to 
the Aristotle's conceptions of the common and proper sensible qualities. 
tlowever Ari stotle 1 s method oi' analysis was not purely objective. ...he 
analysis was that of "sensible qualities", not mere "qualities". of extern&l 
1. ECRU, I, 169, 
.... 
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objects. Whereas Locke's conception of power which is employed here in 
the qualities of bodies is a power of the external object itself. 
It is not a single instance that Locke uses such expression as "Bodies 
produce ideas in us"J But he did not clarify the idea of "power in 
bodies." He did not mention anything a~outli~ in Chapter 21 of Essays 
concerning Human Understanding, where he dealt with the "Idea of Power" 
as psychic power of human mind. 
{b) External sense (sensation) · and internal sense (reflection). 
The senses, "conversant about particular sensible objects, con 
vey to the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to the 
various ways of external senses wherein these objects do affect them." 2 
The content is called sensible qualities, which · are conveyed to the mind 
by the powers of affection of external objects 3a.nd come to be percevtions. ( 
This source of most of the ideas we have, is called SENSATION by U:>cke; 
while "the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it 
is employed about the ideas it has got;--which operations, when the soul 
come s to reflect on and consider do i'urnish the understanding with another 
set of ideas, wh,ich could not be had Jkom things withqut;" such a.s per.,.. 
ception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning~ knowing, willing and 
all the different actings of our own minds, are called REFLECTION or 
l. ECRU, I, 171. 
2. ECHU, I, 122-123. 
3. •External object,• i.e. extra-organic object •• 
4. ECRU, I, 123. 
... 
. ') ,i_ 
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"internal sense." For Locke, these ~. i.e. external material things, 
as the objects of sensation and . the operations or our awn minas within, 
e.s the objects of reflection are the only originals from which all our 
ideas take their beginnings. 
(c) Primary Qualities and Sensus Communis. 
As is mentioned ,above, Locke distinguished qualities in 
bodies end idee.s in mind. .And in the analysis of primary and secondary 
qualities he examined some of the qualities which are related to Aristotle' 
sensible qualities. In Ess!fs concerning Human Underst&nding~ there is 
a paragraph where I.Doke deaei:ibes the same Aristotelian issue of the commo 
sensibles in Chapter V, which consists of only seven lines: 
The ideas we get by more than one sense 
are of space or extension, figure, rest, and 
motion. ~or these make perceivable impressions, 
both on the eyes and touch; and we can receive 
and convey into our minds the ideas of the ex-
tension, figure, meotion, end rest of bodies, 
both by se :;ling and feeling.l 
As Leibniz pointed out, the ideas of space, figure, motion 
and rest, which Locke refers to ~ore than one" ofthe external senses 
are suggestions of the Aristotelian conception of the common sense.2 
Also in Book II, Chapter VIII of the Essays, three qualities 
were described by Locke, in which the primary qualities were enumerated: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
ECRU, I, 
ECHU, I, 
The bulk, figure, number, situation, and 
motion or rest of their solid parts. Thise are 
in them, whether vTe terceive them or not l and 
when they are of tha size that we can discover them, 
we have by these en idea .of the thing as !t is in 
itself; as is plain in artificial things. 
158. 
158. 
The underline is mine. 
ECHU, I, 178. 
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1'hose primary qualities are slightly dif'ferent from the 
above-mentioned ideas of the common sensibles or from the primary or 
original qualities listed on page 170 (ECHU, I). And from further obser-
vation of the following chapters of' Essays~ ileckan.f.'wld~Teta:hlio::'tifatn~cke 
followed the former series of' the common sensibles separately in each 
chapter and the content of the latter was not clarif'ied·· in detail. However 
if' Locke was thinking of the two series as connecting with each other, this 
passage, especially the lilnderirheil '' passage w:i 11 give us some room for 
discussion. Although ·Locke decisively refuted the existence of the innate 
ideas, the primary qualities which are "in bodies, whether we perceive them 
or not" might imply the notion of the qualities which transcend our experi-
enoes. But as he was ·rirmly against the notion of innate principles, he 
could not posit any~ priori powers to the activity of the mind. He says, 
It is an established opinion amongst 
some men, that there are in the under stand-
ing certain innate P.rinciples; some primary 
notions, (}{cH.Vofl: ~Yl'CCH), characters, 
stamped on the mind, which the soul brings 
with it into the world •••• 2 
1. cr. "Qualities which can be perceived by more than one sense"(eoa.on 
sensibles) in ECRU, I, 158 are: Space, extension, figure, rest, motion. 
"Primary Qualities" in ECRU, I, 170 are: Solidity, extension, figure., 
motion or ~east~ number. "Primary Qualities" in ECRU, I, 178 are: 
Bulk, figure, number, situation, motion or rest. "Original Ideas" 
in ECRU~ I, 373:are: Extension~ solidity, mobility ~which are acquired 
by senses from bodies}; perceptivity, moti vity (which are acquired by 
reflection from our minds) and existence, duration, number{whioh are 
acquired by both reflection and sensation). 
2. ECHU, I, 37, Here he illustrates some o~ such primary notions, i.e., 
the Principle of Identity (the power of synthesis) or the ~incip1e of 
Contradiction (the power of discrimination). 
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For Locke, it is ridiculous to think that such principles as the Principle 
of Identity (the power of synthesis) or the Principle of Contradiction 
(the power of discrimination) are furnished to us when we are born • 
• • • it seems almost a contra-
diction to affirm that truths are 
impressed on the 8 oul, of which it 
has no consciousness, and no knowledge 
......... 
•••• to s~ a notion is imprinted 
on the mind, and yet at the same time 
to say that the mind is ignorant of it, 
and never yet took notice of it, is to 
make t~ia impression nothing.l 
However if anything is in .the soul which it has not yet known, 
it would be in this sense, that the soul has the power to know it. ihe 
faculty to know is innate, but the actual knowledge is acquired. But Looka 
never asked, as Kant afterwards did, what this faculty _or "capacity" of 
knowing, which he allows to be latent or innate, necessarily implies. 
For Locke, to be in the understanding means to be understood. This is one 
of the crucial points which ~~re afterwards sharply attacked by Kant. 
If it be said that these principles are known and assented to by all men 
when they come to the use of reason, this is neither true nor conclusive, 
whether understood in the sense that we know them deductively by the use 
of reason, or in th~. sense that we think them as soon as we arrive at the 
use of reason. We know many other things before we know such principles. 
~hat the bitter is not sWeet, that a· rod and a cherry are not the same 
thing, are known by the child long before he understands and assents to 
.the universal proposition that i't is impossible for the same thing to be 
1. ECHU, I, 40. 
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and not to be. If our immediate assent to a proposition were a sure mark 
of its innateness, then the proposition that one and two are equal to three 
together with numberless others, must be innate. 
In the discussion of the sbnple ideas which are acquired throug 
reflection, we understand Thomistic enumeration of the faculties of the mi 
He investigates particularly, the £aculties of perception, retention, dis-
earning, compounding, abstracting, etc. But the clear-cut distinction of 
Thomas' two realas of the activities of the mind, sensus and intelleotus, 
is not differentiated in Lookean psychology. Without denoting the belong-
ing of the faculties, Locke analyzes each faculty of the mind. 
As to the synthetic power of compounding ideas, Locke describes 
how we can acquire the ideas of single objects, separated from all acciden-
tal qualities of real existence (accidental qualities such as time and spao 
and from all accompanying ideas, as uniietial conceptions of the genera 
to which they belong, by the synthetic power of compounding ideas and the 
faculty of abstraction. But he did not refer to the whatness (geidditas) 
of the faculty as such. 
td) Time. 
In connection wi~h the Kantian exposition of the innerer Sinn 
the conception of Time in the Lookean system should be mentioned. 
In describing lime, Locke employs three terms: dtr ation, suo-
cession and motion. It is in Chapter XIII and Chapter XIV of Book II 
(ECHU) that the two qualities of ~ime-peroeption and Space-perception 
became rather important issues in his discussion. But Locke's description 
of Duration and Succession is, as in the case of Aristotelian conception 
of motion, pur ely empirical. lfe get the notion o£ succession "by reflecting 
on the appearing of various ideas one after another in our understanding."! 
1. ECHU, I, 239. 
48 
e . ( 
:i. 
But it is not actual motion which creates the idea of succession or time. 
"A man looking upon a body really moving, peroei ves yet no motion at all 
unless that motion produces a constant train of successive idea8 .nl 
FlrrthaPrhe says: 
Whether these several ideas in a man's mind · 
be made by certain mot ion, I wi 11 not here dispute; 
btii this I em sure, that they include no idea of 
motion in their appearance ••••• It is not motion, 
but the constant train of ideas in our minds whilst 
we are waking, that furnisheS'Us with the idea of 
duration; whereof motion no otherwise give us any 
perception than as it causes in our minds a constant 
succession of ideas •••••• 2 
Here we must notice that the empirical perception of motion 
as such causes no idea of motion itself. It is by "the constant train 
of ideas" that gives the idea of motion. This explanation of motion 
inevitably implies the existence of Self perceiving ideas · as a series 
or succession. But Locke did not go further. 
Conclusion to this chapter. 
As is observable from the various passages of Locke's writing, 
the qualities in bodies and the ideas in our minds are not distinctly 
fcrc mulated. Sometimes they are sjnOnious, sometimes they are separated. 
Sensations are not in bodies, but only in sensitive being. In ather words, 
they are the content of the sense-activity of our mind. ~herefore,they 
can never be qualities of those bodies. In this sense, Locke's explanatio 
of 11Qua.lities" are quite confusing. 
Also as he denied all the possibility of innate ideas or princi 
ples, he could not properly define the nature of the powers of the mind. 
His descriptions ar~ mostly how we can acquire empirically the ideas of 
l, ~CHU, I, 240. 
2. ECHU, I, 247. 
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the external objects. and not what and why such powers of t he mind are 
necessarily ~rnished in our .mind. 
B. Leibniz. 
The psychology of Leibniz i s developed i n his New Essays 
concerni ng Human Onderstanding,1 written in answer to Locke's Ess!Y 
concerning Human Underetandin!• and criticizing it chapt er by chapter. 
In the es says he -no rked out e. theory of the origin and development of know-
ledge in harmony with his metaphysical dootrine of mona.dology. 
As Leibniz himself declared in seTeral passages, he was more 
Platonist than Aristotelian. He wa1 strongly against the notion of 
1 tabule. rase.. 1 
I am nowise in favor of Aristotle's 
t abula ra sa ; and there is somet hing sub-
stantial in what Plato called reminiscence ••• 
• • • for we not only have a reminiscence of 
all our past thoughts, but also a presenti-
ment of all our future thoughta.2 
Aooo~ding to Leibniz, instead of all knowledge coming to us 
directly or i ndirectly through the bodily senses, it is all developed by 
the soul's own activity, and sensutue perception is itself but a confused 
kind o f thought. For him, not only a certain selected super-structure o t 
our ideas , such a s the i dea of the capacity of knowing in Locke, but all 
our ideas, a r e i nnate , though only worked up i nto .actua l thought in the 
deve lopment of knowl edge. nere we oan understand that Leibniz .not only 
tried to separate noetic activity ~ of the soul from Locki an notion of' 
1. The original title is: Nouveaux essais sur l'entendement humain. 
2. Le i bniz, liEHU , 15. All fUrthe r refe rences in B. are t o Leibniz unless 
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acquired ideas, but also he wished to explain the whole universe which we 
experience as such by his doctrine of pre-established harmony. 
Therefore, f1rst of all, he tried to re-establish the Platonic 
conception of mundus intelligi bilis. For him, the soul at birth is not 
comparable to a tabula r sa, but ra·ther to an unworked block of marble, 
- . 
the hidden veins of which already determine the form it is to assume in 
the hands of the soulptor.l And he holds that these hidden veins are 
~ priori ideas which are not acquired by the senses, 
YouJoppose to me this axiom .received .. 
by the philosophers , that there is nothing 
in th& soul which does not oome from the 
senses . But you must except the soul it-
self and its ffections. Nihil est in 
intellectu, 9jod non tuerit in sensu, 
exci pe: NISI~lSsE tN''fELtEcTO's. The soul 
comprises being,- substance, unity, identity, 
cause, perception, reason, and many other· 
notions which the sense a do not give . 3 
Leibniz always ineisted on the active nature of the mental 
units, his ~onads,~ which are forever striving tor development according 
to their pre-established nature. The Lockean notion of the association of 
.I 
ideas tended to create the picture of fixed mosaics of mental elements 
which make up the c:tomplexes of the mind. Leibnis, on the other hand, re-
mained on the side of a dynamic ps,ychology, which insists that activity and 
purpose are basic in mental lite, 
One of the important factors of Aristotle 's Sensus Commuuis was 
1. NEHU, 46. 
2.· Locke,· 
3 • . EHU, lll. 
the ~thetio power of self-consciousness• In New Essays , Leibniz separat- 1 
ed this notion of consciousness from the faculty of sensus and re-nruned it 
apperception.1 Xhe problem of consciousness is also discussed in ui scours 
de etaphysiquea "It is a lnistake to think tha.t all our concepts derive 
from external sensation. For instanoe, the concept that 1 haveJ the concept 
of SelfJ the concept of~ thoughtJ consequently, the concepts of being , 
substance, act, unity, etc., derive from our inner experience. n 2 
Locke assumed, in addition to sensation, reflection,which 
the mind has o:t:· its own operations, as a source of ideas. On the other 
' hand, Leibniz r opresents the innate ideas not a a oonsciou~ notions, but only 
as "slumbering notions tt or ttid6es inn6ee," whioh are consequently not known. 
Therefore, the contrast of the t~~ is les s than would appear from the 
words they employ. All notions are formed through the cooperation of 
external and internal faotorsJ Locke laid emphasis on the former; Leibniz 
on the latter. 
As to the empirical analysis of time (or duration) which is 
described in Locke's Essay that "It is not motion, but a oons~ant auocession i 
of ideas which gives us the idea of duration, It we can find an interesting 
, criticism of Leibniz in his New Essays• 
A succession of perceptions awakes in us 
the idea of duration, but it does not make it. 
Our perceptions never have a succession sutf1-
oiently constant and regular to correspond to 
that of time, which is a continuum uniform 
and s imple. like a straight line.~ 
Changing perceptions turnish us the data for thinking of time 
and we measure it by uniform chang es - If there were no fixed or irr~vable 
1. NEHU,; 166. 
2 • NEHU ; 453. 
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body, space could not be determined. So it is with time. If there were 
nothing uniform in nature, time could not be detennined. And he posits 
a uniform intelligible motion which is the measure of non~uniform motion. 
Leibniz infers this conception of uniform motion from the infinite dura-
tion in God. "Thus space like time has its reality only from him (God)
1 
and he can fill the void ~~an it seams to him good. · Thus it is that in 
this respect he is eve~here."1 
Leibniz's scattered statements about psychology were organized 
and put into teachable form by Wolff (1679-1754). His psychology supplants 
the Aristotelian teachings in the. universities of Ger:many, and his text-
books h 'l.d a great infuence in spreading the use of the German language, at 
once a sign and a cause of the -wane of scholasticism. lt was under the in-
fluence of the psychology of nolff that Kant's thought developed, and the 
influence of Wolff-Leibnizian system was strong on all the later German 
philosophers. 
C. Kant . 
As we have observed in the psychology of Aristotle and Thomas 
the functions of sensus communis or central sense was a synthetic principle 
which perceives the common sensible qualities. By the common Aristotle 
meant something which was experienced in common. But as Kant sharply point 
ed out, Aristotle just picked up such common qualities as they came his wey 
and had no principle in doing so.2 His categories, his enumeration of the 
common sensibles, his list of the faculties of the mind--all are the pro-
1. Leibniz, NEHU, 159. 
2. Kant, KrV, A 81: B 107. All further references in C. are to Kant unless 
otherwise noted • 
. -')· 
53 
-( 
l 
l 
I 
I 
1 . l• ( 
i+.:;:~· : ···. : : 
~~.J;n~ · .< :.: .. 
ducts of his empirical observation of experience. 
This Aristotelian empiricimn was developed in Lockean philoso-
phy. He proposed to try to find out how by means of our mental states we 
obtain infonnation or ideas about the 'WOrld of' experience in which we are,l 
and howfur that information is reliable, and the degree to whioh we are 
justified in placing credence in it .2 However, although he had been aware 
that these two lines of inquiry wre different, Looke is constantly confus- · 
ing what he had distinguished. It was in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason 
that the ~ e two (psychology and epistemology} were defintely segregated. 
The question with respect to knowledge which it was concerned to answer 
was, according to Kant, the question quid juris and not quid facti, the 
question as to the validity of knowledge and not the question as to the 
natural conditions under which knowledge or ideas grows up in the indivi-
dual mind. 
.Lhus for Kant, empirical psychology must stand related to this 
"critical" inquiry. Psychology begins by assuming that the world of 
experie.nce can be broadly divided into two realms of facts,--those whioh it 
is customary to call outer and inner, objective and subjective,--and all it 
explanations are baaed upon the mutual interconnection of these. But from 
the standpoint of a critical philosophy, the division between outer and in-
ner, between objective and subjective, itself demanded investigation and 
defense. 
The relation of ·outer and inner, or objective and subjective, 
is expressed in the analysis of self-knowledge and knowledge of objects 
in relation to space and time.3 
1. This is psychological .inquiry. 
2. This is epistemological inquiry. 
3. KrV, B, 157-8 n. 
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The 1 I think' expresses the act of 
determi:ning my existence. Existence is 
already gi Ten thereby • but the mode in 
"Which I 8Jil to determine this existence, 
that is, the manifold belonging to it, 
is not thereby given. 
lhis manifold is not given to thought in abstraction, but 
~e inner sense or self-intuition. Self-intuition presupposes tiae, as a 
fo ua which is given !. priori, and this form is sensuous, :rtot intellectual, 
a for.m not of the active thought whien determines, but of the passive 
sensibility which receives the manifold to be determined. According ' to 
Kant, I can determine my existence as a thinking being only by reference 
to a given manifold. I can. in short, determine my own existence only so 
far my thought deter.mines under the i"Ol'11!l of time a manifold given passivel 
"CO sense. It is dat.erminabie only as the existence of an appearance in 
t o 1 :un.e. At the same time, since determination in time is impossible except 
by reference to something permanent over against ~self, inner experience 
depends on the existence of such appe:rmanent something or substance. 
J.:herefore, accord!,ng 'CO Kant, knowledge of the self as thinking and knowing 
las well as .reeling and willing) in time and knowledge of physical objects 
existing pe~.ntly in space--are equally necessarY' to whai; we call ex-
perience. riut the experience ot physical objects and the self ia alike 
phenomenal and is only appearance to finite minds of a deeper reality 
which lies beyond.2 
In the Transcendental hEsthetic, Kant seeks to demonstrate 
the empirical reality and transcendental ideali"Cy o1' "Cime. .d:ae is not 
something subsis-ting fur itself or inherem: as an objective qualification 
1. "But if tim.e is the form of our sensibility • it follows that we can 
know ourselves on~y as an appearance in time, not as a thing-in-itself. 
Paton, i\ME, II, 406. Ct. Kant, KrV, A 37•B 54. 
2. Paton, :KME, II, 411. 
. ·, . 
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or order in things. iharefore if abstraction were made of all sub-
jective conditions of perception~ time would remain. iime is nothing but 
the form of inner sense, that is~ oi' "&he intuition of ourselves and of 
our inner state. ~t determines the relation of the various ideas which 
make up our internal state. rsut since all representations~ whether they . 
have for their objects outer things or not, belong, in themselves, as 
determinations of the mind, to our inner state, of which time is the 
formal condition, it follows that time is an !. priori condition of all 
appearance whatsoever. For Kant, time is, in itself, external to the 
subject, nothing.l 
it is sometimes not clear whether by s~ing~ nwe 1 posit 1 the 
ideas of outer sense in time," Kant meant the psychological awareness of 
succession in our minds or whether he meant physical time. In any case 
he insists that time is ~ priori condition of our consciousness of spatial 
iaeas in experience. It contains in itself the relations oi" succession 
simultaneity, and permanence--the permanent being what coexists with a 
succession. ..hese relations are identical with what he oalla the •modes' 
of time.2 
Kant also pointed out a difficulty of the relation of appercep-
tion to the inner sense. ne can intuit ourselves only as we are affected 
internally. :;'his proposition involves self-contradiction. .r-or it means 
that we stand to ourselves in a passive relation.:S 'l'hat is, the self 
both affects and is affected by itself. Inner sense, since it. is sense, 
must be passive--that is the differentia of sense. Yet to give us know-
ledge of the self, it must be affected by the self. ~ore preoisely, inner 
l. KrV, B 50-51= A :34-5. 
2. KrV, A 177=B 219. Cf. A l82-3=B 225-6. 
3. KrY, B 153. 
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sense, which is a passive capacity of the self, must be affected by ap-
perception, which is an active power of the same self.l For this reason 
Kant carefully distinguishes inner sense from apperception, although in 
many passages they are identified. 
Apperception and its synthetic unity 
is very far from being identical with in-
ner sense.· The fo nner, as the source of 
all combination, applies to the manifold 
of intuitions in general, and in guise of th) 
the categories, prior to all sensible in-
tuition, to objects in ~eneral. Inner 
sense, on the other han , contains the 
mere form of intuition, but without can-
bination of the manifold in it, and there-
fore so far contains no determinate intui-
tion, which is possible only through the 
consciousness of the determination of the 
manifold by the transcendental act of ima-
gination (synthetic influence of the under &ta;\·i>i:;-. 
standing upon · inner osense) .• which I _have 
entitled figurative synthesis.2 
.f:Sy Kant the synthetic power of the mind which accept the known 
manifold as a unit is attributed ~o the faculty of the unity of appercep-
tion. The unity of apperception is impossible apart from the unity of the 
known manifold and vice .!.!!..!!:.• The unity of the. known manifold is one of 
the leading discussions of Aristotle's "sensus communis". And by Thomas 
the function was classified as one of the chief activittes of the sensus 
intetiores. But as thormim.td:dned above; by Kant the synthetic power of 
apperception was segregated from the notion of the inner sense. 
1. Paton takes . this to be the implication of Kant's distinction betw~en 
inner sense and the active faculty or power (Verm8gen) of apperception. 
Paton. KME, II. 388. 
2. KrV, B 154. Cf. A 107 and B 139-40. 
. ~·· 
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For Kant, it is a necessary principle or the transcendental principle of 
the necessary synthetic uni~ of the manifold in all our ideas and con-
sequently in all possible intuitions.1 Aristotle, though .he noticed the 
existence of .such ~nthetic power in the mind, faild to define it as the 
necessary condition of experience. Aristotle, as he discovered it in the 
analysis of sense-qualities, considered it as a power or sensation. And 
so it is with Thomas Aquinas. !.ant denied any .active powers to the sensa-
tion. ~And strangely enough, Kant borrowed the Scholastic principles of 
activity and passivity in his expressio~of Spontaneity and Receptivity 
which are the main characteristics of the intellect and sense.) He posits 
'time 1 and 'space' as two necessary 1 forms 1 of reoeptivi ty of the 
manifolds which come through the outer and inner sense. 
Before we finish -chis chapter, we must give a glimpse to the 
usage of Sensus communis in the philosophy of Kartt• The term Sensus 
Communis or Gemeinsinn was employed by Kant to signify a faculty of judg-
ment or a faculty of Geshmack. According to Kritik der urteilskraft, 
Under the se)i~us communis we must include 
the Idea of a. e~~al s&;t;., · i.e. of a. faculty 
of jud~ent wb_iel( ' ~n its .fe~ection takes ac-
count ~!. triod'Y~;,'r the Wi~ of' representation 
of all ot er 'ill.i;iit' 'in thou~tJ in order as it 
were to compare its judgaent ·with the collective 
Reason of humanity, and thus to escape the illusion 
arising from the private conditions that could 
be so easily taken for objective~ which would 
injuriously affect the judgment. 
And further in the same place ~ant distinguishes sensus 
communis and communal sense. 
1. KrV, A 116-17. The word •transcendental' shows that the synthetic 
unity is (1) a necessary condition of expelience, and \2) due to the 
nature of the :mind. Cf. Paton, .KME, I, 459. · 
2. KU, 169. 
·. ·• 
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.:· ~:-~~ -· -c~jl~  
·' . .c.~y~;i;. ::~:, : . ·... . " 
58 
) 
l 
· ·11! • • 
I_ 
faste can be calied -sensus communis with 
more justice than sound understanding can; 
and that the aesthetioal Judgment rather 
than the intellectual Jll8Y bear the name of 
a oommuna:l sense. if we are willing to use 
the .word "sense" or an effect of mere re~c­
tion upon the mind: for then we understand by 
sense hha :reeling of pleasure.. We could . 
even de.fine i 'aste a:s the raculti of j\ldging 
of that which makes Universally cOIIIIIlUllioable, 
without the mediation of a oonoeptl ~ur 
reeling in a given representation • . . 
··'As we can understand it ftoii these passages. the notion of 
Kant's sensus communis is far from the ·,~Aristotelia.n usage of the term. 
Probably thi _a .h ~~-t:~er to the meaning in which it is employed in the 
.: · .. 
Scottish philosophy, especially of Reid. It m&V,·,;J>e said that the usage 
: ·: ~~~;- ~i. 
of the term is similar to the Scholastic usage of vis aestimativa. But 
as an animal judgment, it does not imply the conception that all men 
posses s in common. Suffice it to say that Kantian usage of the sensus 
cor@;unis has almost no relation to his doctrine of transcendental a e sthe-
tics nor to the original usage of Aristotle. 
l. KU, 169. 
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CHAPTER · VI 
C 0 D C L U S I 0 N 
I 
II As we have obserTed above, Ari3totle viewed the several f onns 
· 1 of cognitive activi t'-•s a s 1'alling into a kind of order .or scale. The 
first, that which is the basis of the whole cognitive activity, is sens•~ 
perception ( gY~c £ ) wh.i oh ha s for its objects individual thing3 {~ 
C(VT0 ). Senae-peeception was regarded by htm aa the faculty of rece iv• 
i ng the forms of things apart . trom thei r matter, just a the figure o f 
a seal is taken on by the wax without the gold or other metal of which 
the seal is composed . 
However, for Aristotle, sense-perception was not merely a 
passive receptivity; it was an act of the mind, a discriminative as well 
as s.ynthetio act. Al though he f ailedin dr&wing ~ precise line of dis• 
tinction as to whether thi s,ynthetie act belongs to the faculty of sense 
or th faculty of intellect, we must admit that he was the first empiricist 
who analyzed the content of sense-percept i on and recognized in it a special 
charaoteri t ic ( Ycftcx odo:t?:p-rt ) tor each sense, (such as co l or fo r 
the eye ) and common p roperties which were apprehended by several of the 
' ) i:h, /. 
senses ( ffC)L. Vd QWPyzp<) • 
, ">If' ~~/ "' ;A / This distinction of tote! q c. ~rx and HOlVCX ar-7 nx was 
high ly for.malized in Xhomi stic p~ohology. ' ~nat Aristotle tried to express 
' 
as the functions of the mind.. Thomas desori bed by the term !!!, {power, . 
T 
I VarmrYgen). were translated sensu :J _erovrii, p roper 
s ens es or s '3n sus exteriores . externa l s enses. '-On the cont r a r y , n:e 0Vo< 
_0'1--.;?..;tf;..;~..--~-T~....,;;..f. __ ~tnd othe·r f a cu l t i e s of the sense-perception ( at l east 
Ari stotle believed them as sense-perception), such as .!!.! a e stimativa • 
.!!.!!. cogi t e.ti ve._, .!!!_ imaginativa_, .!.!!. reminscentia.fJ , vis memora.tiva, ware 
classified under sensus interiores or interna l senses. Tna reason vmy 
Thoma s put them in plura l forms for these tvro main subdivisions of sen se-
perception wa s becau se h e attempt e d to classify t h e f'l.mctions of t he mind 
in the sense•perceL;tion, distinctly aprtrt from the conception of the per-
OE.>pta. The notion of' senaus a.part from the sensible qualities, the con-
ception of po 1er apart from the content o f cognitive activitie s_. v..'as what 
Thomas wante d to define by the t orm vis . 
. -
But the employment of the terms, 
interiores and exterio r e s- implies t h e empirical i nduction from which the 
not i on of povrer derives. But a s Thomas discu sses the sim1l9.r problems 
of imagination and memory in the study o f 'i_!ltellect', and a,s we can 
not ioe t h at he was trying t o find out the proper ground of locati ng such 
synt hetic po mrs in ' sensa:tion, l ·the soie e xcuse of' permittirJg them in 
t he fie l d of sense - a ctivitie s is.) ece.use they ere observable in all 
' ani mals'.), he could not dif'ine exactly the nature of the synthetic 
po.:rer o f' sensation as such.. As a matter of :fta:ct, the description of 
sensus exteriore s in Summa Theologica (I , 78) is so incompl ete that unless 
we t h ink of his l a tte r ohapters, it is ha~.dly said .~o be oonsistenti.~ 
lhe problem i s a li.ttle more complicated in Looke. First of 
all, he refuted al l the possibility of innate principles. ln the Ess~ 
he attemp-ted to con duot t he inquiry into the origin, certainty and extent 
o t human knowledge ' in a siaple historical way, ,1 that is, by showing 
whenoe and how we come to haTe "ideas," and by examining the processes of 
1
- -. -. 
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.~. !. 
61 
manipulation in the mature intelligence. Starting from the conceptions of 
"empty cabinet," and "tabula rasa" , Looke finds that the several nideas" 
which fom the r aw material of knowledge a r e supplied to it by the ta) sen-
sation and (b) rft.t'leotion, or ( a) external e.nd (b) i nternal observation. 
By the former we obtai n our Heae of sensible things; by the latter our 
ideas of the mind• s own ope,re.tions, suoh as peroehing, thinking , doubting, 
willing# et.o. But he did net get into deeper analysis of how we QRn acquire 
the lde.a. of sensat ion and refleoti~"~n, a s such? Or what 5. s the b a sis of the 
presupposition :l.n dividing the external from the internal? If they are 
not innate ideas, then Ymat a. r e they ~dhow osn we ·have them s principles? 
Furthermore , smong stmple ideas of sensation, Locke made the distinction 
bet ween ideas of primary end i deas o f secondary qualities. The former are 
re semblances o r copies of the actual properties of things; the ideas we have 
o f the exten~ion, f'j.gure, texture end motion of the par ts of' things accur ate 
ly r ep r E! sent the nat ure of' th thlngf: the.t give rise to them. 1'he latter 
are not sesemblanoes of any ch&re.oteristica possesse d by things themselves, 
but ar e e ffects prod l"ed, through the operation upon our senses, of powers 
whioh t hings posse ss by rea.~on of t heir primary qualities . As 1 t vas shar p• 
l y pointed out by Leibniz, the notion of p rimary qualities nr c merely a 
mod:i. f'_cat ion of Ad stotle ' s .!!.~ oommunis. 'l"he Aristotelian mental 
f aculti e s ~ere the p~oducts of ampiric .l en Rlysis of the content of' sensus 
in genGr a l. But Locko did not g i ve any ade quate explanation to the g round 
of the se f a cul ties . We can :i.nfer them by the analysis of' experienc e, but 
we cannot defini t ely apprehend t h em by sheer induoti ve analysis of their 
r esul ts . 
·.rhe introduction of apperception by Leibniz was a certain 
solut i on to this pr obl em. The basis of all kno ledge is. a ccording to htm, 
percep ti on, and of perception there are differences of degree but not of 
atO-tle..!..s_a.nd___Thomas...!_s_~~:h~o~l~oge.,y_J=1!=. =~~~~===!'~~!!'!====It====== 
I 
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="-JI===o -------I ~ be said to be that of unconscious or crude ; perception, in \\lJ'lich there is 
~ion of a manifold in vhat is perceived but of neither is the sub j e ct 
clearly a.we.ro . A further stage is that of ¥1e.ppereoption 11 in wh i ch the per-
beptions h ave reached a certain measur e of clearness and di stinot i e ss , and 
I r 9 subject is a""re or tho multiplicity vohioh is U.'lited in tho c ontent ap-
Lrehended . lind a highe r stage , still, is th~d: of refl ection., or of se lf-
1oonsoi ouG cognition, in wh:i.ch the subj ect marshal s i ts pe rceptions or ideas 
t
n the light of the I~undronental pr j ncipl es of contr:,1.diction and suff ic ient 
eason (i . o. t he !) rincip l e of <Jausality) . Acco rding to him, all thought or 
eroeption is thought or perc eption~ something . Bt:t what i s r eally outside 
~he monad c an only be th(' other monads and 6d, end, since there i s no externa 
inf luence exerted on the monad , it can only ideally repr ·ssent what is taking 
lple.ce in i t s environment. From th i s ; Lei bnt z de scri b es mat cri nl wo rl d , ex-
1 
!tended in spac e .; apprehended as phenome::J.al in char cter, a wey in -whi ch ulti-
r te r e a l ity i s obscn r ely r epre sented t hroug.!-_ me ans of sen se-pe rception . 
/Thus , for Leibni z, t h e oharacte r i sties of space as appr ehended are , i n one 
!s ense , subjecti v·:J , in that they do not corr·2spond to 'J.rho.t is r eal, an d in 
enot _e r s ensf.' , object ive, in t hat they nr e common to the pe rcept ions o f all 
t he monad s at a ca r ta i n stage of devel opment . 
Kant c ri tici zod this Le ibnizie.n po3 _ tion. Ac co rding t o Leibniz, 
/he st ys, the sensuo us ap prehtmsi on of t in s _v;h1.ch clo t hes t hem with sp oe -
rela t ion and tho intellectual ap pr ehension which leaves such space-relations 
out differ only in degree of clearnl3s s , and it is the s a..me v.rorld o f things 
!con f usedly apprehended by sense a s a spatially extended wor ld "P.lhich i s 
lleotually appr ehended ~~ .r~il e.ted only in the f ashion of eo existences . 
intel-
The 
\ same ccnsiderati on(may apply to Leibniz•s oontention that t:ime ~ as .,_re e.p-
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prehend it .in perception, is but the ob scur e a nd confused pi cture of the 
I gr~und s which determine the c rder o f sucoes sion. 
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conceptions of time and space were further de-reloped. The knowledge n·a.s 
reunited lth reality by the.! ,E!.iori principles. Known objects aeeo rding 
to Kant, a r c o. multiplicity of sense-mataria.l s uppli;;-d to the approhe~., ding 
mind v hich synthesizes them in accordance with certain forms of intuition 
\space and time) and certain, categories of thought (substance and attribute , 
cau se and effect .• eta.). And Kant conclude the.t · ihnt the multiplicity of 
sense-m~l.terials ay be befo re the mind has synthesized them, we do not kno .· 
and we cannot know. fit they are given to the mind and Ooj) Jl rehondod and 
• 
moulded by it . 'fheref'ore e can knov; '1things-in--t:hemsc lves 11 so f a r as t hey 
are given as ph(mor.1enu. to our mind. On the other hand, the forma of intui-
tion und the ca tegories of thouRht t\rE1 vray s in vrhich the mind i n virtue of 
its own nature moulds or sy3tamatizes thP. mu ltiplicity of disconnected sense 
materia ls so as to adapt them to its own unity. Fo r Kant these forms are 
a priori or "transcendental "(In th'J sense that they are not derived from. 
experience . ). nd exp~rience itself v:oul d be impossible without them. 
On the other hand, the multiplioi ty of sense-material is !. po~tariori, 
only given in E;xperienc~ and known through it ( though not knom "i n itself') 
Thus Kau t limited hu..-nan knowledge 1'-'i thin ·the realm of "phenomena'" not of 
"noumena 1 or 11 t hings-in-thems e lves. n 
The discus:>ion of the innor ~-nd the o·L: ter senses ·pere thus 
placed in the!!. Erior :i forma of time · ,nd spnce b'-J Kant. An. so far e .. s we 
see the :. att ::n· epistemologically , ~re mu st f:'_dndt that time is a. condition o f 
our k:r)o" 1 edge without which our inner expe rience s which e. re in a oonste.nt 
flux are not pos sible. Though Kfmt sometime s obscurely ¢lsting;uishes the 
svnthet t c t r !mscendcmtal ap:p e r c ept:ton ~md tho inne r s~nse, i.t was R g reAt 
contribu t ion that ·unt op <::ned e. n ow realm of trnnscendentalism in tho 
analys is of i·.e cognit i ve powE1rs . 
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ABS'l'RA.C'l' 
e purpo e ot thi the ia is to present a oonoentr ted study 
of the ''Sensus Communi " in the Philosophy of Aristotle, 1'homas Aquin •• 
Locke , Leibniz and Kant. 
The conception o f the "Soneus CotaUnisu was first introduced 
in th f1 ld of pqohologioal atu~ by Aristotle. In the De Anima, _ atter 
he ex ined the function of ee.ch peripheral sense-organ of sight, hearing, 
sm lling, t st ing and touch, . he proceeded to the anal;rsh of the "Sen~a 
Communis," which discriminate b tweon these par t icular perceptions which 
r pero ived by the f ive enaea and unit s th into pero ptual vmol es . 
When we reflect on the matte r, . e.er,y object that falls under 
the a na will be appr~ended a.a ::dating or operating somewhere and 
omet i e. A rose , for example, is not mer ly red and fragrant, it also 
has surf oc, extension, ehape, solidity, a definite size , and evon local 
t ion if i t sway in the breeze. A song, . for instance, . is not erely a 
s ries of audito r,y stimuli. I t also h a a definite tompO, a met r, accent 
and rhytlu:l. .ono of th spatial t'eatur • of the rose and none of the 
to pora l oh r cteristioa of the melc~ are peroeived by any one o t the 
five seasee ulcne • . ihus r i $tctle started to enumsrate those oo mon 
qualit1 swhioh h nomed "Common Son iblea," 1 •• , motion, form . number, 
m.ar-nitud and rest~and tim ) • 
As w oen e sily soe from this listing of the ' Common S nsible 
the e qualitie s imply sp t io-temporal r e l at ion wh~oh 1 1 ront in all 
sense• perooption. hi self se J~.- t o h va noticed this End 
attributed ell the common properties t o the guali~ of motion. from which 
he also att~pted to expl.,ain the oonoeption of t ime . 
But while h was groping his wey in t;tie field of sense-experi-
ences, he enoountere~ several problems whioh seemed to have a great signi-
ficance in interpreting the aoti vity of sen.se-peroeption. .l<'irst of all , 
he noticed that, though each sense-erg~ perceives 41tferent qualities 
of t he object. we are not sen ing the obj eet ~s e manifold . ~ell of 
the rose end oolor of th·9 saxne are two different experiences. But we are 
sen sine- the same ro s . and never doubt 'Whether it is t •o or one. Ther mu!'lt 
be, P.eco rdi ngly , some principl e of the unifioation of sense-perception 
Which is net fUrnished in each proper p ripheral sense•organ. Aristotle 
nAfl,ed thh synthet i o Mtivity o f the mind c entral sense . 
The closer examination of the matter will disclose several 
important facts that the existence of suoh a synthetic faculty is in-
evitab l e and necH~s ·5ury . For instance, self-con3ciousness or the percep-
tion. t h ut we peroei ve must be one of the synthetic f aculty . Or lower level 
judgment, in so far as appl iea to the compariaon, contrast , and discrimina-
tion o:r" t h e deliverances of sense-organs, may b e said to belong to thi e 
cent .ral po ,er of sonse-peroeption . Beside these, imag i nation whioh is 
residual sense•ima.ges or th9 reproduction of once-acquired sense- images. 
Le ., memory ~md r eminiscence , must h~.ve their principle rhich operate 
for their preservation r.nd reproduction, no l!!atter whether it is vO.luntary 
po· , r or :tnvo l untary . 
Thus. the role of Sensus Communis or central sense of Aristotle 
can be summarized: ( 1) the unification of the primary sensibles or t he 
complete act of sense-perception; ( 2) the pe raeption of perception, i . e ., 
consciousness; {3) the suspension of consciousness or sleep; (4) the 
oogn:lti on of ·i:;he "eo1mn.on sensibles " ; (5) judgment. in so far as it 
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appli e s t o t he compari son, cont rast, and di scrimination of t he deliverances 
of sense s; ( 6) imaginetion, or th e residual 3ense images; ( 7) memory 
(including reminiscence), or the voluntary and involuntary reproduction ot 
sen sation. 
In the Thomistio formula, sensus ~~ is classified under 
the subdivision of Sensus Inter ior as and is de f ined as communis radix 
. omnium sentium. Eo eve r it :i s not clear whethe r by this communis radix 
Thomas meant merely a higher raoul ty of the mind or some .! priori prino1.- . 
ple of acquiring the externa l world. From this we can only understand 
a common g round in ·which all exterior s~nse functions are rooted . this 
analysis of Sensus Communis inevitably leads us to somewhat noetic 
acti·vj.t y o f our mind . lf re int erpret sense-organs a s several gates 
through hich the outside orld will be brought into u.s, :.L'homas' distinctio 
of the inner e.nd outer senses is to be said app rop ri ate. .r:sut in that case, 
ho we can segregate urely noetic activity of the intellect from the inner 
senset For Thomas, the d1.v1d 1ng p rinciple 'Wll.S whe·t•iler the faculty wa8 of 
an im.a.l o.r o t man. 
Xhe prob lem ie a litt l e more complicated in Locke, who re!~ted 
11 t he possibility o f i nnat e principles. J.'herefore, he could not explain 
how we can a c quire t he f acult i e s d'fs.,nsat ion and reflect ion, which he 
a ssigned r e spectively ·to exte rna l and interna l observation • . ~he point 
was sh ~rply orit1ci zed by Lei bniz. 
Aooording to him, perception is divided into twos the lower 
per ception of unconsciousness, in which there is union of a manifold in 
what is perceived, but of neitheria the subject clearly aware, and the 
higher perception 'Which is called by him "apperoeption11 in whioh the 
percai:,tions have rea ched a certain measure of clearness and distinct-
ness nnd i n which the subject ia aware of the multiplicity 'Which is 
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united in the cont ent apprehended . And he attributed th s,ynthetio power 
to thi s notion of awareness and renamed it apperception. Under the con~ 
i 
oeption of apperception, Leibniz includes t he concept that I have 1 the 
concept of the solf; the concept of m:1 thought, which derives f'ro m our in- j 
ner xperienoe. Further e.niysie of the matter leads us to the notion of 
succes sion of pe rception which affects our inner sense and awake s in us 
t he idea of duration . .However; For Leibniz, the duration itself is not 
made of t he oollection of the particular perceptions. Just a s space can 
not be deter.mined if there is , no tlxed or immovable body; so time can 
not be determined ~~thout something uniform in nature . Xhue he posits 
an uniform intelligible motion whioh is the measure of non-unif'o nn, 
particular JJ~Qtions. He infers the conception of uniform motion from the 
infinite duration in God• 
This Leibnizian interpretat ion of the uni form intelligible 
\not sensible) time was adopted bY Kant P. s an a priori form of the inner 
sense. It is a pure fo~ of the sansible intuition through whi ch the 
outer world of things-in-themselves are given to us as phenomena or 
repr esentation. lantian oonception of time as a form of i ntuition does 
not derive trom our experience. Kant distinguiShes empirical time 
lwhich oan be diVisible as the object of perception) from time a priori. 
lbe former can be apprehended by the inductive study of •motion' 
whi ch we can see in Mistotlet s empiricism. However, we cannot neglect 
the f act that , when Aristotle discusse d the problems of motion and time 
as one of the "CoJIJDOn Senaiblea n and sought for the inner princ i ples 
wi1ioh perceive such qullitiee, the way to t he transcendental philosophy 
has alreadf been prepared, though it was not explicitly stated in 
Ari stotle and therefore left as problematical. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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